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Abstract: Arb-med is a form of hybrid dispute resolution that combines an adjudicative 
approach (arbitration) with a non-adjudicative approach (mediation). Dispute resolution clauses 
requiring arb-med will assume a popular role in resolving disputes that arise under China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative. This article argues that China should regulate arb-med in a way to reconcile local 
practices (mediation) with international expectations (arbitration) in context of the BRI. As an 
economic bloc proposed by China, the BRI development has the potential to promote dispute 
resolution means with Chinese characteristics such as arb-med. Global comparative study of 
leading arbitration jurisdictions in the East and the West shows a heightened awareness of arb-med 
due process concerns regarding international enforcement of arb-med awards. Most recent reforms 
on arb-med by leading Chinese arbitration institutions, such as the CIETAC, BAC and SCIA, 
evidence a trend toward bifurcating the two processes when facing international clients. China is 
aware of procedural justice in the hybrid dispute resolution. The establishment of the China 
International Commercial Court (“CICC”), and its creation of the “One-Stop” Platform shows the 
need to attract foreign parties, in addition to merely Chinese ones, and the pressure to compete in 
the BRI dispute resolution market. These are the leading factors that drive Chinese regulators to 
look beyond sociopolitical imperatives and cultural boundaries in promoting arb-med outside of the 
Belt and Road. As China is anticipated to propel the BRI arbitration system, Chinese arb-med, and 
its unique process, will remain a fluid area of localized globalism in contrast with globalized 
localism in China-led BRI dispute resolution development. 
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I. INTRODUCTION PART
Arb-med is a form of hybrid dispute resolution that combines an
adjudicative approach (i.e., arbitration) with a non-adjudicative approach 
(i.e., mediation). During arb-med, the arbitration and mediation1 stages are 
carried out by the same person in sequence. A typical arb-med proceeding 
arises when the parties have entered into arbitration and, within that 
arbitration procedure, decide to mediate. If and when mediation fails, 
arbitration resumes under the same mediator-turned-arbitrator(s), and an 
award is rendered. Dispute resolution clauses requiring arb-med will assume, 
as this article argues, a popular role in resolving disputes that arise under 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”). But what are the reasons and 
perceived advantages of arb-med that are propelling increased reliance on 
the same? More importantly, given the due process concerns over hybrid 
arbitration and mediation procedures in China,2 how can arb-med be 
effectively deployed in BRI cross-border disputes without compromising 
considerations of due process, justice, and efficiency? These issues warrant a 
systematic study of Chinese arb-med, especially in the context of China’s 
leadership of BRI development and its norm-setting capabilities3 through the 
BRI.4 
What makes arb-med particularly worth studying is not only that it is 
a hybrid process, but also that it requires the neutral to assume multiple roles 
that have incompatible aims and serve contradictory functions. Therefore, 
arb-med is particularly vulnerable to poor dispute-resolution system design. 
The popularity and success of establishing an arb-med system with 
fair procedures varies among individual jurisdictions. Arb-med in China is 
particularly problematic. Jurisdictions with established arb-med systems in 
their domestic and cross-border transactions, such as Australia, have had few 
issues with arb-med. In some Western jurisdictions, such as the United 
1  Chinese law and rules of Chinese arbitration institutions translate the Chinese term of mediation 
(tiaojie) as “conciliation.” They are used interchangeably. See Carlos de Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: Med-
Arb and the Confluence of Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial 
Disputes in China, 18 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 149, 152 (2004). 
2  See Carlos de Vera, supra note 1, at 185–187; Weixia Gu, The Delicate Art of Med-Arb and Its 
Future Institutionalisation in China, 31 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 97, 102–110 (2014).  
3 Zheng Sophia Tang, “The Belt and Road” and Cross-Border Judicial Cooperation, 49 HONG 
KONG L.J. 121, 129–131 (2019). Indeed, one of the core tenants of the BRI strategy is the harmonization of 
the rules to increase predictability of transnational commerce and to reduce costs. 
4 Id., at 122. 
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States, combinations of arbitration and mediation are controversial largely 
because the potential for conflicts of interest in such hybrid processes is seen 
to be too great to overcome. The controversy has limited the popularity of 
arb-med in these jurisdictions. Due process concerns have not prevented arb-
med from gaining popularity in Asia, however, where mediation is strongly 
rooted in its legal and dispute resolution culture. To prevent arb-med from 
standing at odds with due process and justice concerns, Japan, Hong Kong, 
and Singapore—among others in Asia—have recently enacted provisions 
implementing proper procedural standards for arb-med proceedings.5 China, 
where arb-med is widely used in commercial dispute resolution, however, 
lacks regulatory governance in this area.6 As such, Chinese arb-med has 
been challenged, and its practice questioned, over whether it is compatible 
with procedural justice. 
This article focuses on the issues surrounding the resumption of 
arbitration after the mediation stage and how it is perceived and used in 
China. In particular, it highlights the procedural difficulties brought about by 
the Chinese approach to mediation, how these difficulties might prevent 
parties from adopting arb-med for cross-border disputes, and what China has 
done and is doing to address procedural concerns to promote greater 
adoption of arb-med in the context of its ambitious BRI development. 
Structurally, this article is organized as follows. Following the 
Introduction, Part II first discusses the definition of arb-med at the 
conceptual level. Part III then considers why arb-med is popular in China 
and how the process is perceived in practice. Part IV studies the procedural 
concerns that plague the existing Chinese arb-med practice. These concerns 
include the conflicting roles of the neutral, who “switches hats” from being 
an arbitrator to a mediator and back, and their challenge of confidentiality. 
Part V analyzes the regulatory problems of arb-med in China and how China 
has attempted to mitigate those due process concerns. Market-based 
regulatory competition among hundreds of Chinese arbitration institutions 
and their needs to internationalize, and reach out to foreign users, are 
identified as having caused Chinese arb-med to flourish and develop from a 
bottom-up institutional aspect. Part VI examines the global experiences in 
5  MICHAEL PRYLES & VERONICA L. TAYLOR, The Cultures of Dispute Resolution in Asia, in 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ASIA 1, 15–17 (Michael Pryles ed., 3d ed. 2006). 
6  See Paul E. Mason, Follow-Up Note to ‘The Arbitrator as Mediator, and Mediator as Arbitrator’ 
(2011), J. Int. Arb. 6, 541 et seq., 29 J. INT’L ARB. 225, 225 (2012). 
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regulating arb-med. Among the jurisdictions investigated, Singapore in Asia, 
Germany in continental Europe, and Australia in the Pacific are of particular 
relevance to China; the experiences of these jurisdictions have already 
impacted some rule reform of the most influential Chinese arbitration 
institutions. Part VII argues that the BRI has led China to consider new 
initiatives to promote the use of and confidence in Chinese arbitration. In 
particular, the recently established Chinese International Commercial Court 
(“CICC”) has set up a One-Stop Multi-tier Dispute Resolution Platform (the 
“One-Stop” Platform), with the promotion of arb-med as one of its top 
priorities. Leading Chinese international arbitration institutions designated 
by the CICC’s “One-Stop” Platform are increasingly seen as norm-setters to 
address the procedural difficulties of Chinese arb-med in the cross-border 
BRI dispute resolution setting that has been left out of China’s Arbitration 
Law. Finally, Part VIII concludes that the development of arb-med, and its 
unique process in China, will remain a fluid area of localized globalism in 
contrast with globalized localism in China-led BRI dispute resolution 
development.  
II. TERMINOLOGY
This section clarifies the usage of terminology. It serves three
purposes. First, it argues against using any sort of term with “arb” and 
“med” hyphenated, in various orders, to describe the hybrid dispute 
resolution process because of the potential for confusion. Second, it specifies 
that the use of “med-arb” and “arb-med” in this article will assume that the 
order of the procedures is what is reflected by the order of the hyphenated 
words. Third, it clarifies that “arb-med” in this article should be understood 
to mean “arb-med-arb.” 
Conceptually, definitional analysis of arb-med is necessary due to the 
inconsistent use of “arb-med,” “med-arb,” and “arb-med-arb” in legal 
scholarship. Interpreted literally, these three terms refer to the order in which 
arbitration and mediation stages take place. “Med-arb” and “arb-med” are 
thus not used interchangeably.7 The confusion sets in when “med-arb” is 
7 Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The New Arbitration, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 86 
(2012); Jacob Rossof, Hybrid Efficiency in Arbitration: Waiving Potential Conflicts for Dual Role 
Arbitrators in Med-Arb and Arb-Med Proceedings, 26 J. INT'L ARB. 89, 89 (2009) (med-arb and arb-med 
distinguished). 
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more often used in literature as an umbrella term for any form of hybrid 
process involving arbitration and mediation.8  
I propose that references to any combination of arbitration and 
mediation should not be made using the above terms, as the “stage dash 
stage” naming already implies a certain order in which the stages should be 
conducted. Such naming allows us to discuss various variants of hybrid 
processes involving arbitration and mediation together without conflating 
them and should remain exclusive to specific forms of arbitration-mediation 
combinations. Whatever term the field will settle on for this umbrella 
meaning, be it “combination of arbitration and mediation” or “hybrid 
arbitration and mediation”, it should not imply any order at which the 
respective stages are to be conducted as with the current scheme. 
With the umbrella concept settled, discussion must turn to the 
meanings of “arb-med,” “med-arb,” and “arb-med-arb.” Each of these terms 
is, for their namesakes, some form of a dispute resolution procedure that 
combines arbitration and mediation.9 Arbitration and mediation are 
performed sequentially in the order described. While hybrid procedures can 
be performed with multiple neutrals across stages, each of these processes 
referred to in this article is only performed by the same neutral.10 In “med-
arb,” the parties attempt to mediate from the outset of their dispute, and then 
enter arbitration proceedings for unsuccessful mediation or their remaining 
unresolved issues or matters. 
By contrast, “arb-med” and “arb-med-arb” require more nuance. 
Nottage and Garnett, authors of definitive arbitration and mediation 
scholarship, prefer that the combined procedure begins as an arbitration, not 
a mediation. And if it starts as a mediation that succeeds, there is logically 
no further dispute or difference capable of triggering arbitration, and hence 
8 “Med-arb” is used as an umbrella term in, among others, Thomas J. Stipanowich & Zachary P. 
Ulrich, Commercial Arbitration and Settlement: Empirical Insights Into The Roles Arbitrators Play, 6 Y.B. 
ON ARB. & MEDIATION 1, 9 (2014); Brian A. Pappas, Med-Arb and the Legalization of Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 157, 204 (2015); Carol A. Ludington, Med-Arb: If the Parties Agree, 
5 Y.B. ON INT'L ARB. 313, 314 (2017). 
9 Tai-Heng Cheng, Reflections on Culture in Med-Arb, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS, 421, 421 (A.W. Rovine Ed., 
2010). 
10 See Bobette Wolski, ARB-MED-ARB (and MSAs): A Whole Which Is Less than, Not Greater than, 
the Sum of Its Parts, 6 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 249, 258–260 (2013). 
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capable of generating an enforceable arbitral award.11 The procedure in 
Nottage and Garnett’s description is more accurately described as “arb-med-
arb.” Parties using “arb-med-arb” engage in arbitration from the outset and 
then, in the course of arbitration, decide to have the arbitrator settle the 
subject matter through mediation and, based on the parties’ wishes, the 
applicable arbitration rules or lex arbitri. The arbitration stage is then stayed, 
and the same arbitrator proceeds to act as a mediator, subject to arbitration 
rules governing such mediation. There are two scenarios in which the second 
arbitration stage may arise. The first scenario is when mediation is entirely 
successful and a full settlement has been reached. The mediator will then 
become an arbitrator solely for the purpose of issuing an arbitral award in 
accordance with the settlement, i.e., the consent award.12 The second 
scenario is when mediation efforts are futile or the parties only reach partial 
settlement. Then, a substantive arbitration hearing will be re-conducted for 
the remaining matters. The resulting award will be rendered on the basis of 
the partially settled outcome and the second arbitration proceeding. In both 
scenarios, the arbitrator ceases to act in their capacity as a mediator and 
resumes the role of arbitrator for the last stage.  
It is helpful to also clarify that “arb-med” in the literal sense does not 
exist. “Arb-med” does not tend to occur in real practice because a final stage 
of arbitration must occur to render the award once mediation has ended. In a 
literal sense, “arb-med” is a process where the parties have opted for 
arbitration and then agreed to resort to mediation, often to preserve a more 
harmonious relationship. But given parties who have opted for arbitration 
from the outset, with the expectation of enjoying the robust global 
enforceability of arbitration outcomes, it is quite unreasonable that parties 
would opt for a settlement at the end. Therefore, “arb-med” in actuality 
refers to “arb-med-arb” processes, where a last arbitration stage will occur 
either to render a consent award or to render an award after unsettled issues 
have been ruled on. As such, strictly speaking, and because it is unlikely that 
“arb-med” might exist, this article uses “arb-med” to mean “arb-med-arb” 
processes. In other words, “arb-med” and “arb-med-arb” in the present 
article are interchangeable. 
11  Luke Nottage & Richard Garnett, The Top 20 Things to Change in or around Australia’s 
International Arbitration Act, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN AUSTRALIA 149, 179 n.2 (Luke Nottage 
& Richard Garnett eds., 2010). 
12 Tai-Heng Cheng & Anthony Kohtio, Some Limits To Apply Chinese Med-Arb Internationally, 2 
N.Y. DISP. RESOL. 95, 95 (2009).  
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III. PRACTICE AND PERCEPTION OF ARB-MED IN CHINA
A. Arb-Med Statistics
While reliable statistics on arb-med are difficult to find, arb-med may
be present in nearly half of the arbitrations in China. 
Arbitration in China is increasing. In 2017 alone, 239,360 cases were 
processed by the 253 arbitration institutions in China.13 Compared to 2016, 
arbitration caseload increased by 15%.14 China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”), China’s leading arbitration 
institution by caseload—which includes a sizeable portion of all 
international commercial arbitration in China—handled 2,370 cases or 1% 
of total arbitration cases in China in 2017.15 
As for cases where arb-med may be concerned, as of 2001, about 20–
30% of CIETAC arbitration cases were withdrawn after settlement or 
arbitration was concluded on the basis of a settlement agreement.16 CIETAC 
reported in 2014 that 21.61% of its foreign-related cases were resolved 
through mediation.17 
Data on arb-med adoption in China in general is lacking. However, 
since September 2015, CIETAC and the China Academy of Arbitration Law 
have been compiling and publishing statistics on arbitration cases concluded 
by mediation in the preceding year, i.e., cases concluded by mediation, or 
cases of consent awards.18 In 2018, 26% of the arbitration cases in China 
were concluded through mediation (i.e., 26% of the awards rendered in 
China in 2018 were consent awards).19 Despite the steady increase of the 
13 See CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ZHONG GUO GUO JI SHANG SHI ZHONG CAI 
NIAN DU BAO GAO (2017) (中国国际商事仲裁年度报告 (2017)) [ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2017)] 1, 8 (2017). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 WANG SHENGCHANG (王生长), ZHONG CAI YU TIAO JIE XIANG JIE HE DE LI LUN YU SHI WU 
(仲裁与调解相结合的理论与实务) [THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMBINING ARBITRATION WITH 
CONCILIATION] 1, 83 (2001).  
17 See CHINA ACAD. OF ARB. LAW, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2014) 1, 50 (2014). 
18 The data of the previous year is only available in the September publication of the current year. 
19  CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ZHONG GUO GUO JI SHANG SHI ZHONG CAI NIAN DU 
BAO GAO (2018-2019) (中国国际商事仲裁年度报告 (2018-2019) [ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2018-2019)] 6, 7 (2018-2019). 
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overall number of the arbitration cases concluded through mediation, its 
ratio among all arbitration cases was down from 29% in 2017,20 58% in 
2016,21 41% in 2015,22 and 65% in 2014.23 Although caseload data of 
Chinese arbitration concluded through mediation is more available recently, 
there is insufficient data to demonstrate the overall adoption of arb-med in 
China. Even so, the average percentage of cases in which consent awards 
were given (i.e., the overall ratio of successful arb-med) could be as high as 
47.07% (see Table 1 below). The data do not include those cases where 
mediation attempts were futile, i.e., where mediation was adopted in the 
arbitration process but for various reasons did not lead to a consent award. 
As such, the overall adoption rate of arb-med in China could only be higher 
than 47.07%. 
Table 1: Arb-Med Statistics in China in Recent Years24 
Year 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Average 
Total Number of Arbitration Cases 113,660 136,924 208,545 239,360 539,542 247,606 
Number of Arbitration Cases 
Concluded by Mediation (i.e., by 
Consent Award) 
74,200 56,659 121,527 69,450 140,281 92,441 
Percentage of Arbitration Cases 
Concluded by Successful Mediation 
(i.e., by Consent Award) 
65% 41% 58% 29% 26% 47.07% 
20 CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2017), supra note 13, at 13. 
21 See CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ZHONG GUO GUO JI SHANG SHI ZHONG CAI 
NIAN DU BAO GAO (2016) (中国国际商事仲裁年度报告 (2016)) [ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2016)] 13 (2016). 
22 See CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ZHONG GUO GUO JI SHANG SHI ZHONG CAI 
NIAN DU BAO GAO (2015) (中国国际商事仲裁年度报告 (2015)) [ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2015)] 9 (2015). 
23 Id. 
24 CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2018-2019), supra note 19, at 3, 6-7. CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, 
ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2017), supra note 13, at 8, 13; 
CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2016), supra note 21, at 8, 13; CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, 
ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2015), supra note 22, at 8-9. 
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B. Perception of Arb-Med
Arb-med as used in international disputes has an additional
international dimension not found in arb-med as used in domestic contexts. 
In many ways, arb-med adds an international dimension (i.e., arbitration) to 
the local product (i.e., mediation).25 Through cross-border arb-med, foreign 
parties are not only exposed to Chinese mediation, but also to the practices 
of Chinese-style arbitrators and arbitration institutions. These practices are 
sometimes too lax and do not square well with international arbitration 
standards. The Hong Kong case of Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye, which concerns 
the use of hybrid dispute resolution to resolve a share transfer dispute, is a 
typical example of how Chinese arb-med can potentially frustrate the 
international enforcement of an award tainted by apparent bias.26 Although 
the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong overturned the appellate and enforced the 
award, Keeneye demonstrates that foreign courts of enforcement may not 
readily accept the arb-med procedural standards deemed acceptable to a 
Chinese supervisory court.27 
To understand the mediation stage within arb-med, arbitral institutions 
should consider how mediation is practiced domestically in China as an 
independent dispute resolution method. Mediation conducted outside arb-
med (e.g., in judicial mediation and mediation by the People’s Mediation 
Committees) contributes to how arbitration institutions think about the 
proper standard of mediation when designing and conducting their mediation 
stage of arb-med. 
The Chinese approach to mediation has followed the trend of general 
mediation by adopting certain features of arbitration. These include 
adversarial advocacy, adjudication by a neutral, and the neutral attempting to 
25 Weixia Gu, When Local Meets International: Mediation Combined with Arbitration in China and 
Its Prospective Reform in a Comparative Context, 10 J. COMP. L. 84, 84 (2016) (arguing that, while 
mediation is more culture-laden and jurisdiction-specific, arbitration has largely been harmonized 
internationally due to the successful efforts by the international legal instruments in the field such as the 
New York Convention (1958), the UNCITRAL Model Law (1985, amended in 2006), and the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules (1976, amended in 2010 and 2013)).  
26 Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 650–60 (C.A). 
27  See generally Weixia Gu & Xianchu Zhang, The Keeneye Case: Rethinking the Content of Public 
Policy in Cross-border Arbitration between Hong Kong and Mainland China, 42 HONG KONG L.J. 1001 
(2012) (in which I argue that, due to the handover of Hong Kong to China under the “one country, two 
systems” dynamic, Hong Kong courts are more likely to defer to court findings by Mainland Chinese courts 
than other foreign courts).  
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steer a mediation proceeding to lead to a certain outcome.28 While this 
development is not unique to China, Chinese mediation is noted to be more 
“adjudicatory, aggressive, and interventionist.”29 Some practitioners have 
commented that parties are forced into mediation during arbitration, and 
some lawyers are even “gaming” mediation to intentionally delay the 
proceedings and seek more information from the other party.30 Reflections of 
Chinese uniqueness, however, are in the courts, where parties often enter 
into judicial mediation under pressure from the presiding judges.31 Judges 
are in turn under pressure to settle cases through mediation to reach 
performance targets. The policy imperative for judges to encourage 
mandatory mediation has made reliance on mediation an institutional 
outcome, which sustains a culture of mediation.32 
In the context of arb-med, this mediation culture translates into more 
active arb-med management by arbitrators. Fan, author of empirical study of 
arbitrators acting as mediators in China, conducted a survey of 36 active 
arbitrators from CIETAC, Beijing Arbitration Commission (“BAC”), and 
Wuhan Arbitration Commission (“WAC”) taken between 2011 and 2012 
showing a glimpse of arbitrator attitudes towards arb-med and how such 
attitudes have affected the use of arb-med.33 According to Fan’s study, 50% 
of the respondents have recommended the parties to mediate in more than 
90% of the cases in which they acted as an arbitrator;34 more than 10% of 
the respondents have recommended mediation in more than 70–90% of the 
cases they arbitrated.35  
As for parties to disputes, Fan’s survey shows that where both sides 
are Chinese, the parties are more likely to consent to arb-med than when 
foreign parties are involved.36 The survey also shows the reasons that the 
28 Nolan-Haley, supra note 7, at 63. 
29 Hualing Fu & Richard Cullen, From Mediatory to Adjudicatory Justice: The Limits of Civil Justice 
Reform in China, in CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 33, 25, 33 
(2011). 
30 Thomas J. Stipanowich et al., East Meets West: An International Dialogue on Mediation and Med-
Arb in the United States and China, 9 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 379, 395–96 (2009). 
31 Fu & Cullen, supra note 29, at 33. 
32 Id. 
33  Kun Fan, An Empirical Study of Arbitrators Acting as Mediators in China, 15 CARDOZO J. CONF. 
RESOL. 777, 791 (2014). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 792. 
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respondents choose to adopt a conciliatory role. Most respondents believed 
that “the agreed outcome is easier to be voluntarily enforced than a decided 
outcome in an arbitral award.”37 The second and third cited reasons are that 
arb-med can reduce costs and improve efficiency and that mediation respects 
the free will and voluntariness of the parties.38 
Compared to arbitration, mediation is more culture-laden and less 
judicialized. Mediation’s dependency on culture is a result of its aim of 
inducing voluntary settlement by the parties, and appealing to the cultural 
backgrounds of the parties is a way of achieving this aim. Arbitration, by 
contrast, is governed by international rules and norms developed through the 
deliberations between potential users and regulators of various jurisdictions. 
It is designed to be an international dispute resolution method.39 In China, 
mediation is a product of its Confucian legal culture and the State 
governance imperative to promote social harmony. Confucianism favors less 
contentious means of resolving disputes with an emphasis on mediation, and 
views more contentious means such as litigation and arbitration to be less 
conducive to the maintenance of social harmony as predefined and 
constructed by the relationship between the individual and the community.40 
While the ends are the same, the State governance justification to promote 
mediation is more instrumentalist. Mediation is used to promote better 
governability of civil society and to reduce visible and publicized conflicts 
that might potentially reduce the legitimacy of the Party-State. It was not 
until the enactment of the Civil Procedure Law (1991) that cases were not 
required to be mediated before adjudication by China’s People’s Courts 
when the former had failed.41 Mediation is designed, therefore, to meet the 
Confucian culture and State governance objectives of dispute resolution in 
China. As a result, foreign users may find Chinese mediation alien during 
arb-med processes. 
C. Culture and Sociopolitics as Drivers of Arb-Med Popularity
The State has made it very visible that it supports arb-med and the
Arbitration Law has mandated all Chinese arbitration institutions to provide 
37 Id. at 790. 
38 Id. 
39  WEIXIA GU, ARBITRATION IN CHINA: THE REGULATION OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND 
PRACTICAL ISSUES 3–5 (2012). 
40  Id. at 32–34. 
41 Xianchu Zhang, Rethinking the Mediation Campaign, 10 J. COMP. L. 44, 45 (2015). 
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arb-med in domestic and cross-border arbitration when the parties have 
requested it.42 But what are the driving factors for arb-med’s popularity in 
China? The original design of China’s Arbitration Law, including the 
requirement that all arbitration institutions must offer arb-med, could be 
influenced by Chinese sociopolitical needs and Confucian traditions of 
social harmony. 
1. Confucian Culture
Attributing the success of arb-med to the Confucian tradition for
harmony is a trope in Chinese arbitration scholarship.43 This argument 
suggests that Chinese culture favors virtues (li) over rules or law (fa) of the 
Legalist tradition. Virtues, unlike harsh laws, induce benevolence between 
predefined social relations that prevent conflict between social actors.44 
Social actors are discouraged from actively asserting their rights and 
interests if others default their obligations.45 Legal actors are only 
individuals in the context of social relations. In dispute resolution, therefore, 
this translates into a preference for more amicable, less adversarial 
processes. Thus, under Confucian legal thought, mediation is encouraged 
over litigation and arbitration to prevent societal contention and the collapse 
of social relations. 
Before assessing the validity of this argument on arb-med’s 
popularity, cultural analysis of legal practice and norms warrants a caveat: 
this mode of analysis might fall victim to reductionism. It might be more 
accurate and useful to attribute the differences in practice between 
jurisdictions beyond references to cultural and traditional stereotypes. These 
stereotypes become less valid when parties appoint personnel from multiple 
legal cultures (such as appointing foreign counsel or arbitrators) and when 
arbitration institutions attempt to internationalize by adopting more widely 
accepted dispute resolution norms.46 China may allow arb-med with the 
same personnel, but that does not mean East Asian jurisdictions in general 
42  Zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa (中华人民共和国仲裁法) [Arbitration Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 51, 
8 CHINA L. & PRAC. 23 (1994) (China). 
43  WEIXIA GU, ARBITRATION IN CHINA, supra note 39, at 32–34. 
44 Albert H. Y. Chen, Confucian Legal Culture and Its Modern Fate, in THE NEW LEGAL ORDER IN 
HONG KONG 505, 515 (Raymond Wacks ed., 1999). 
45 Id. at 517–18. 
46 See Tai-Heng Cheng, Reflections on Culture in Med-Arb, supra note 9, at 425. 
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have less respect for due process. Japan, for instance, has taken greater steps 
than China to avoid due process issues while preserving arb-med as a 
popular means of dispute resolution. The Japanese Arbitration Law, unlike 
the Chinese Arbitration Law, stipulates that the neutral can only play the 
dual role of mediator and arbitrator if both parties have consented in writing, 
and the dual capacities must end when any one party withdraws such written 
consent.47 Such level of protection against irregularities is only afforded by 
rules of some individual arbitration institutions in China rather than the 
Chinese Arbitration Law as a whole. Thus, it is too reductionist to conclude 
that a Confucian legal culture is responsible for less respect toward due 
process safeguards in Chinese arb-med. 
This caveat does not mean all cultural analyses are futile. Despite that 
the behavior of Chinese parties and practices of Chinese arbitration 
institutions involved in cross-border arbitration can be seen as products of 
multiple legal traditions, the practices of arbitration and arb-med promoted 
by the Chinese government are distinctively Chinese. Cultural analyses are 
perhaps more accurately tailored as legal-political analyses that are 
influenced by traditional culture. After all, the way culture manifests itself in 
legal norms is largely shaped by the legal and political institutions that 
implement legal norms. 
2. Sociopolitical Imperative
In China, the “design from the top” (dingceng sheji 顶层设计)—to
use a policy buzzword used by today’s Chinese Central Government to 
promote judicial reform—may be inspired by foreign trends, but legal 
reformers are very clear that such trends are specifically selected to reflect 
the needs of China and the BRI development. Indeed, one of the five basic 
principles expressed in the Supreme People’s Court’s Diversified Dispute 
Resolution Opinion is that the “diversified dispute resolution system with 
Chinese characteristics” must be perfected by “basing it on the 
circumstances of the nation, reasonable adoption [of foreign experiences].”48 
47 Chūsaihō [Arbitration Law], Law No. 138 of 2003, art. 38 (Japan), translated at 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/sihou/arbitrationlaw.pdf. 
48 Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Ren Min Fa Yuan Jin Yi Bu Shen Hua Duo Yuan Hua Jiu 
Fen Jie Jue Ji Zhi Gai Ge De Yi Jian (Fa Fa [2016] 14 Hao) 
(最高人民法院关于人民法院进一步深化多元化纠纷解决机制改革的意见) (法发 [2016] 14号) 
[Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on People’s Courts Further Deepening the Reform of Diversified 
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This exercise of selecting what international arbitration norms to 
adopt in China reflects that Chinese reformers cannot breach certain norms 
entrenched in domestic sociopolitical context. As more Chinese companies 
are investing in foreign countries, China is also taking reference from other 
jurisdictions when designing its own dispute resolution systems. The China 
International Commercial Court (“CICC”), for example, is inspired by other 
commercial courts around the world such as the Singapore International 
Commercial Court.49 Singapore’s arrangement setting its commercial court 
within its highest court likely also inspired the CICC’s position and linkage 
within the Chinese Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”), as CICC is an integral 
part of China’s SPC.  
But it is unlikely that China will adopt international norms beyond its 
political mandate, even when it might reconcile differences in legal norms 
among Belt and Road jurisdictions one day in the future. These constraints 
exist in spite of China’s attempts to internationalize. This is apparent from 
SPC Justice Gao Xiaoli’s interview regarding the CICC. She noted that other 
commercial courts have foreign judges and have judgments in English 
despite it not being an official language of the country.50 These are areas 
where China would find it hard to change, even when the Chinese legislature 
has the legal power to remove such barriers by amending the Organic Law 
of the People’s Courts, the Judges’ Law, the Arbitration Law, and the Civil 
Procedure Law. 
But there is no indication of this potential internationalization from 
the legislative comments on the draft of the Arbitration Law in 1994.51 
Instead, the comments focused on attributes of arbitration that would be a 
feature of “Western law.” Indeed, the comments stated that the consultation 
Dispute Resolution Mechanism] (Court Issuance No. 14 of 2016) (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., June 28, 
2016, effective June 28, 2016), CLI.3.273230 (EN) (Lawinfochina). 
49 He Jingjin (何晶晶) & Yan Zhenshan (耿振善), Da zao guo ji shang shi fa ting si fa bao zhang 
“yi dai yi lu” jian she—zhuan fang zui gao ren min fa yuan min shi shen pan di si ting fu ting chang gao 
xiao li (打造国际商事法庭，司法保障“一带一路”建设—
专访最高人民法院民事审判第四庭副庭长高晓力) [Creating the International Commercial Court, Legal 
Protection for the Belt & Road Construction—Interview with Gao Xiaoli, Deputy Chief Justice of the 
Fourth Division of Civil Trial of the Supreme People's Court], RENMIN FAZHI (人民法治) [THE RULE OF 
LAW OF THE PEOPLE] (Feb. 10, 2018), https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/wwM5Obhz069STbeJ73oMdA. 
50 Id. 
51 Angran Gu (顾昂然), Guan yu zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa (cao an) de shuo ming 
(关于《中华人民共和国仲裁法（草案）》的说明) [Comments on the Arbitration Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (Bill)] (1994), http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2001-01/02/content_5003212.htm. 
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draft was written “on the basis of consolidated working experience of 
arbitration, on the basis of the need to construct a socialist market economic 
system”52 and referenced “the valuable experiences of foreign arbitration 
systems and international norms.”53 Besides the need to construct a socialist 
market, the documented legislative intent does not indicate any need to base 
China’s arbitration rules on Confucian values. Even when one argues that 
social harmony is an embedded feature of a socialist market system, the 
comments manifest social harmony through economic language. 
Thus, contemporary cross-border arbitration norms are primarily 
shaped by the need to attract foreign parties and investors to use Chinese 
arbitration services. Where there is no such demand, as in domestic 
arbitration, developments and reforms lag behind. Some measures first 
implemented in “foreign-related” arbitration were eventually applied to 
domestic arbitration, but reforms to domestic arbitration were conducted to 
make arbitration regulations more consistent within China and to reflect the 
SPC’s pro-arbitration judicial position. 
The design of arbitration law, norms, and institutions has affected how 
arbitrators approach arbitration and arb-med. In Fan’s survey referred to 
above, the arbitrator respondents who believe arb-med to be appropriate 
(88.1% of all respondents) chose ease of enforcement of settlement 
compared to award, advantages in costs and efficiency, and respect to party 
free will and voluntariness as the primary reasons for conducting arb-med.54 
These reasons are mostly technical and related to the efficiency of dispute 
resolution rather than cultural factors. 
Only a few of such respondents (6 out of 32) stated that traditional 
Chinese culture has influenced them to conduct arb-med,55 and only one 
respondent said “mediation reflects the local culture in China and therefore 
is more easily accepted by the Chinese.”56 Though not representative, this 
respondent’s response reflects how culture can manifest itself through the 
advantage of dispute resolution efficiency without being an influence on arb-
med practices in China per se. However, a more interesting point these six 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Fan, An Empirical Study of Arbitrators Acting as Mediators in China, supra note 33, at 805. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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respondents have shown is that domestic legal culture can spill over to 
influence how cross-border dispute resolution is conducted.  
Chinese arbitration institutions and practitioners are conscious of this 
spill-over effect. CIETAC, for example, has added a provision in its 2015 
Rules expressly allowing independent mediation during arb-med with the 
consent of both parties to address the concerns of “parties and arbitration 
professionals with western culture background [who] are concerned with or 
even skeptical of the process in which arbitrators act as mediators at the 
same time.”57 Practitioners have expressed that arb-med is noticeably more 
popular among Chinese users than those from elsewhere.58 
Although there is some spillover of domestic legal culture to cross-
border arbitration, arb-med is not positioned by institutional design as a 
replacement of hybrid arbitration-mediation by different neutrals or even 
institutions. As Chinese arbitration institutions and State judicial institutions 
internationalize and reach out to foreign users, the influence of domestic 
culture is expected to wane. But as the establishment of the CICC has 
demonstrated, when domestic culture is necessary for the State to achieve 
certain legal-political norms, the domestic culture is most likely preserved. 
One solution, which leading arbitration institutions have discovered, is to 
make explicit the autonomy that parties have to choose whether to use arb-
med—hence satisfying the needs of both Chinese and Western parties. 
Nonetheless, arb-med in China is not only an area where domestic and 
international norms co-exist, but they display increasing tension. 
IV. PROCEDURAL DEFECTS OF CHINESE-STYLED ARB-MED
While the Chinese government has encouraged Chinese arbitration
institutions to “go abroad” (zou chuqu) and compete with regional 
institutions, the chronic problem with arb-med procedural defects remains 
unresolved. This is in spite of the frequent and recent revisions to rules of 
various Chinese arbitration institutions. Few have fundamentally addressed 
procedural irregularities embedded in the arb-med system long identified by 
scholars and practitioners, leaving the usual defects of actual and apparent 
bias and protection of confidentiality largely unaddressed. 
57 CHINA ACAD. OF ARB. LAW, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN 
CHINA (2014), supra note 17, at 50. 
58 Fan, An Empirical Study of Arbitrators Acting as Mediators in China, supra note 34, at 792. 
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A. Conflicting Roles of Arbitrator and Mediator
The main criticism of arb-med is the conflict of interest between the
arbitral and mediatory roles assumed by the neutral. The concern is whether 
the neutral can remain impartial given the different approaches and attitudes 
required for the two dispute resolution methods. It is the norm in China for 
the arbitrator to “switch hats” and become the mediator when mediation 
occurs within the arbitration proceedings. In such case, arbitration is stayed 
and is resumed only when mediation fails. 
A source of the conflict of roles is how arbitrators, as opposed to 
mediators, should conduct themselves in the course of the proceedings. In 
the proceedings, the arbitrator takes on the role that decides on an 
appropriate award, based on the merits of the submissions from both parties. 
It is a legal process in which the arbitrator must interpret relevant laws and 
apply them to facts, just as a judge would do in a court.59 The mediator, by 
contrast, does not inquire into the appropriateness of a settlement reached by 
the parties. Instead, the mediator is more interested in having the parties 
reach a settlement agreement developed on their own. 
Because of the very different aims of the two forms of dispute 
resolution, the approach required of the neutral must not be the same in all 
stages of arb-med. A competent arbitrator should be disinterested and display 
a “judicial temperament.”60 She must observe the requirements of 
impartiality and general legal competence from which she draws respect 
from the party.61 A good mediator by contrast should be sensitive to inter-
party relationships and to discover the needs of the parties that might hide 
below mediatory exchanges, or the parties’ opposing positions. In facilitating 
settlement and communication between the parties, the mediator may take a 
more involved, personal approach. When practiced separately as single-tier 
dispute resolution methods, even for the same subject matter, the dispute 
resolution process generally has no due process concerns. Theoretically, an 
arbitration proceeding can suffer no irregularities or biases, actual or 
apparent, when the same person switches between arbitrator and mediator if 
she can maintain the standards required of her in arbitration and mediation 
59 Paul E. Mason, The Arbitrator as Mediator, and Mediator as Arbitrator, 28 J. INT’L. ARB. 541, 
541 (2011). 
60 Id. at 543. 
61 Id. 
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respectively. Due process concerns do not arise from hybrid resolutions per 
se but from the very human difficulty of partitioning information obtained in 
the two stages to ensure impartiality. 
China’s Arbitration Law is silent on whether the parties can request 
third-party mediation from an independent mediator.62 But the mediatory 
role of the arbitrators is generally assumed as a matter of practice. The arb-
med rules of leading Chinese arbitration institutions with experience in 
cross-border arbitration, such as CIETAC, BAC, Shanghai International 
Arbitration Center (“SHIAC”) and Shenzhen Court of International 
Arbitration (“SCIA”), also reflect this assumption.63 The 2015 CIETAC 
Rules, for instance, state that “[w]ith the consents of both parties, the arbitral 
tribunal may [mediate] the case in a manner it considers appropriate.”64 The 
rule empowers the tribunal to conduct mediation but is silent on whether 
third parties can also mediate. It has been reported that CIETAC assembled 
an independent panel of mediators on the request of a party in one case.65 
The 2015 CIETAC Rules attempt to provide non-CIETAC mediation, but it 
only vaguely provides that “CIETAC may, with the consents of both parties, 
assist the parties to conciliate the dispute in a manner and procedure it 
considers appropriate.”66 It is unclear how the parties may be “assisted” 
under this rule or what arrangements have been made under the rule. 
The 2015 BAC Rules are more explicit with alternative arrangements. 
They provide for independent mediation at BAC’s Mediation Center in 
accordance with the BAC Mediation Center Mediation Rules.67 But such 
62 Sally A. Harpole, The Combination of Conciliation with Arbitration in the People’s Republic of 
China, 24 J. INT’L. ARB. 623, 627–28 (2007). 
63 See China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Arbitration 
Rules (promulgated by China Council for the Promotion of International Trade/China Chamber of 
International Commerce, rev’d Nov. 4, 2014, effective Jan. 1, 2015), art. 47(2) [hereinafter 2015 CIETAC 
Rules], http://www.cietac.org/Uploads/201902/5c6148b100105.pdf; Beijing Arbitration Commission 
(BAC) Arbitration Rules (rev’d July 9, 2014, effective Apr. 1, 2015), art. 42(1) [hereinafter 2015 BAC 
Rules],  available at http://www.bjac.org.cn/english/page/ckzl/sz2015.html; Shanghai International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (SHIAC) Arbitration Rules 
(effective Jan. 1, 2015), art. 41 [hereinafter 2015 SHIAC Rules], 
http://www.shiac.org/upload/day_141230/SHIAC_ARBITRATION_RULES_2015_141222.pdf; Shenzhen 
Court of International Arbitration (SCIA) Rules (effective Feb. 21, 2019), art. 48 [hereinafter 2019 SCIA 
Rules], available at http://www.sccietac.org/web/doc/view_rules/914.html. 
64  2015 CIETAC Rules, supra note 63, art. 47(2). 
65 Harpole, supra note 62, at 627. 
66 2015 CIETAC Rules, supra note 63, art. 47(8) (emphasis added). 
67 2015 BAC Rules, supra note 63, art. 43. 
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mediation is separate from the arbitral proceedings and is thus not a form of 
arb-med. As with self-settlement, parties who have reached a settlement 
agreement through the Mediation Center can request the arbitration tribunal 
to render an award based on that agreement,68 allowing the agreement to be 
enforced in foreign jurisdictions under the New York Convention. With the 
approval of the BAC Chairperson and additional costs borne by the parties, 
the BAC Rules also allow international arbitrations to replace the arbitrator 
after mediation fails.69 The explicit arrangement for a separate mediation 
mechanism and allowing arbitrator replacement is rare among arbitration 
rules in China. Similar to other rules, though, the language of the BAC rules 
still does not expressly allow the possibility of mediation by independent 
mediators.  
Besides language in arbitration rules that tend to lead parties towards 
institutional arb-med, the parties may also choose their arbitrator to mediate 
because they are already familiar with the arbitrator, and the arbitrator is 
familiar with the facts and background of the dispute.70 The parties can be 
sure that they can trust the arbitrator. Such an arbitrator will also allow 
quicker arbitration and award rendering if and when mediation fails.71  
However, whether trust and the saving of time and costs do draw 
parties into arb-med is dependent on the legal culture. Empirical study 
shows that mutual consent for arb-med is far more likely to be given when 
both parties are Chinese.72 Presumably Chinese parties are more familiar 
with the arb-med process embedded in their dispute resolution culture, while 
foreign parties are less trusting of the process. Foreign parties might also 
expect an award rather than a settlement agreement by the end.73 
B. Confidentiality
A thornier procedural concern has to do with the confidentiality of
information. The issue of due process arises when the neutral, such as the 
mediator, reverts to becoming an arbitrator. In this process, the information 
obtained by the neutral during the mediation stage might, consciously or 
68 Id. art. 43(2). 
69 Id. art. 67(2). 
70 Weixia Gu, When Local Meets International, supra note 25, at 89. 
71 Id. 
72 Fan, An Empirical Study of Arbitrators Acting as Mediators in China, supra note 33, at 792. 
73 Id. 
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otherwise, be relied on by the neutral in the subsequent arbitration stage.74 
Such information would not normally be communicated to the arbitrator in 
arbitration when practiced alone. Mediators who practice evaluative 
mediation might also reveal to the parties the merits of their respective cases, 
which would not be known to the parties in arbitration until the award is 
rendered.75 
Distinct from arbitration, mediation allows ex parte communication, 
or caucusing. Information given by a party to the neutral during caucuses is 
not known to the other party. The other party has no opportunity to defend 
against such confidential information.76 It is for the mediator to determine 
the truthfulness of the information and the extent to which that information 
should influence her decision in the arbitration stage to come should 
mediation fail. Parties might also use caucuses to privately influence the 
neutral in the favor in the subsequent arbitration. Because mediation may 
involve discussions into personal and emotional issues between the 
respective parties and the mediator, the neutral may become more 
sympathetic towards a particular party.77 Admittedly, whether the parties 
create bias through these interactions is dependent on the conduct of the 
individual neutral. The fact that neutrals can and may be biased indicates a 
gap in the regulation of arb-med. Indeed, partiality might only be known or 
is apparent to parties when mediation fails, at which point it is too late to 
remedy the proceedings.78 
The Keeneye case in Hong Kong shows the potential dangers of 
caucusing in creating bias, actual or apparent. The tribunal, of the Xi’an 
Arbitration Commission (“XAC”) in China, was composed of a presiding 
arbitrator and two arbitrators nominated respectively by each side.79 After 
the first hearing, the tribunal suggested mediation to the parties, and lawyers 
on both sides expressed their consent to the arbitrators attempting to resolve 
the matter as mediators.80 The tribunal also, on its own initiative, proposed 
74 Weixia Gu, When Local Meets International, supra note 25, at 90. 
75 James T. Peter, Med-Arb in International Arbitration, 8 AM. REV. INT’L. ARB. 83, 83 (1997). 
76 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, When Arbitrators Facilitate Settlement: Towards a Transnational 
Standard, 25 ARB. INT’L. 187, 198 (2009). 
77 Peter, supra note 75, at 93. 
78 Weixia Gu, When Local Meets International, supra note 25, at 89–90. 
79  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2011] H.K.C.F.I. 240, para. 16 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
80 Id. at paras. 17–19. 
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that the respondents pay the claimants RMB 250 million as settlement.81 The 
tribunal then appointed XAC’s Secretary-General and the claimant-
nominated arbitrator as mediators and informed the parties of this 
proposal.82 The Secretary-General and the claimant-nominated arbitrator 
contacted a person, who described himself as “a person related to (or 
affiliated with)”83 (guanxiren 关系人) the respondents. According to the 
XAC Rules, “[w]ith the approval of the parties, any third party may be 
invited to assist the mediation, or they may act as the mediator.”84 The 
Secretary-General and the claimant-nominated arbitrator asked him to a 
private meeting at a restaurant in the Xi’an Shangri-La Hotel.85 At the 
meeting, the Secretary-General asked the respondents’ affiliate to “work on” 
(zuogongzuo 做工作) the respondents, which is understood to mean to get 
the respondents to accept the settlement proposal.86 The respondents 
nonetheless rejected the settlement proposal.87 The arbitration tribunal 
reconvened after the failed mediation and decided to award the respondents 
RMB 50 million.88 The respondents challenged the award before the Xi’an 
Intermediate People’s Court, but the court upheld the award.89 
The enforcement of the award was then challenged in the Hong Kong 
Court of First Instance (CFI).90 The CFI refused enforcement on the grounds 
that the “wining and dining”91 meeting would “cause a fair-minded observer 
to apprehend a real possibility of bias on the part of the Arbitration 
Tribunal.”92 Although evidence showing actual bias was insufficient, the 
interactions at the Shangri-La meeting and the contrast between the 
proposed settlement and the final award were sufficient to constitute 
apparent bias.93 This apprehension of bias was enough for the enforcement 
of such award to contravene Hong Kong’s public policy—that is, “the most 
81  Id. at para. 22. 
82  Id. at para. 22. 
83 Id. at para. 22. 
84 Id. at para. 21. 
85  Id. at para. 22. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. at para. 48. 
89  Id. at para. 7. 
90  Id. 
91 Id. at para. 67. 
92 Id. at para. 3. 
93 Gu & Zhang, supra note 27, at 1006. 
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basic notions of justice and morality of the Hong Kong system.”94 The judge 
opined that, “[t]he risk of a mediator turned arbitrator appearing to be biased 
will always be great.”95 This decision was reversed when the party seeking 
enforcement appealed. The appellate court decided to uphold the arbitral 
award on the basis that the enforcement court should have given greater 
weight to the decision handed down by the Xi’an Court, in the supervisory 
jurisdiction in Xi’an, which found no apparent bias and held that the arb-
med was properly conducted.96 
It cannot be assumed that the same standard of apparent bias and 
deference applied by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal will be replicated by 
foreign courts. The appellate judgment questions whether balancing the 
exercise of promoting arbitration while ensuring that due process is observed 
is done correctly.97 Indeed, reviewing an arbitration and its procedures in 
light of public policy at the enforcement jurisdiction level is the purpose of 
the enforcement courts. If deference for the supervisory court is too readily 
relied on, then public policy grounds to refuse award enforcement can only 
be applied in excessively narrow circumstances.98 
Unlike those of other jurisdictions, due process safeguards in arb-med 
rules are limited in China. A typical set of arbitration rules in China does not 
contain provisions specifying the use of information collected from 
mediation. At most, the rules only provide some safeguards that prohibit the 
parties from relying on any statements expressed during the mediation stage 
by the other party or the tribunal to support their case.99 Generally, no 
provision bars the tribunal from relying on information provided to them 
during the mediation stage when deciding on an award afterwards. Even if 
such rules did exist, they might be difficult to put into practice, since they 
would require the arbitrators to keep secrets from themselves. 
Nonetheless, after the initial refusal to enforce the award in Keeneye, 
Chinese arbitration institutions have taken some steps to mitigate potential 
procedural irregularities. CIETAC revised its rules in 2014 to expressly state 
94 Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek Engineering Co., Ltd., [1998] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 287, para. 47 
(C.A.) (H.K.). 
95 Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2011] H.K.C.F.I. 240, para. 72 (C.F.I.) (H.K.). 
96 Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 650 (C.A.) (H.K.). 
97 Gu & Zhang, supra note 27, at 1023. 
98 Id. 
99 See, e.g., 2015 BAC Rules, supra note 63, art. 42(5). 
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that with the parties’ consent CIETAC may assist the parties to mediate the 
dispute “in a manner and procedure it considers appropriate”100 if the parties 
do not wish for mediation to be conducted by the same arbitral tribunal.101 
The previous 2005 CIETAC Rules did not suggest that mediation within 
arbitration can be conducted by someone other than the tribunal. The change 
in the subsequent 2012 CIETAC Rules notifies the parties that mediation by 
the arbitral tribunal is not the only available option. As noted above, 
however, what CIETAC considers to be an appropriate manner and 
procedure of mediation is unclear. 
In addition, no statutory safeguards targeting caucusing are available 
in Chinese law. This sets the Chinese statutory regime aside from other 
jurisdictions. Hong Kong, for example, has the Arbitration Ordinance based 
upon the UNCITRAL Model Law. The ordinance allows arbitrators to 
assume the role of mediators so long as the parties consent and have not 
withdrawn their consent in writing.102 The ordinance expressly provides for 
a disclosure safeguard: if and when mediation fails, a neutral having 
confidential information from a party, “must, before resuming the arbitral 
proceedings, disclose to all other parties as much of that information as the 
arbitrator considers is material to the arbitral proceedings.”103 Singapore’s 
International Arbitration Act has a similar safeguard provision.104 This 
safeguard requires disclosure to both parties of what information was given 
to the arbitrator, and prompts the parties to defend against such information 
during the arbitral proceedings. 
V. REGULATORY PROBLEMS OF ARB-MED IN CHINA
Arbitration in China is regulated by several sources of law. There are
statutes, judicial interpretations and guiding cases issued by the SPC, and 
occasional regulations and circulars from the State Council. The rules of 
individual arbitration institutions also govern how arb-med is practiced. 
However, governance of arb-med is not well institutionalized, and a bulk of 
its regulation relies on individual rules of arbitration institutions. This is one 
of the reasons the procedural defects discussed above are still a pervasive 
100 2015 CIETAC Rules, supra note 63, art. 47(8). 
101  Id. 
102 Arbitration Ordinance, (2019) Cap. 609 § 33(1) (H.K.). 
103 Id. § 33(4). 
104 Sing. Int’l Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) s 17(3). 
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problem when practicing arb-med in China and why parties—especially 
foreign parties—are still suspicious of arb-med in China. 
Statutes only play a small, but nonetheless foundational, role in 
regulating arb-med. China’s Arbitration Law (2017) has had no major 
amendments105 since its promulgation in 1994 and regulation of arbitration 
is mainly achieved through the SPC’s judicial interpretations issued 
throughout the past twenty years. Within the Arbitration Law, only Article 51 
addresses arb-med but does little to define how it ought to be practiced. 
However, Article 51(1) does require Chinese arbitration institutions to 
provide for the procedure of arb-med: 
The arbitration tribunal may first conduct mediation before 
rendering an award. If the parties agree to mediation, then the 
arbitration tribunal shall conduct mediation. When mediation 
fails, the tribunal shall duly render an award.106 
This Article empowers all arbitration institutions in China to conduct 
arb-med, and all domestic and international arbitration institutions in China 
include such an arb-med clause in their arbitration rules resembling the 
above statutory language. Although Article 51 requires the tribunal to respect 
the intentions of the parties to mediate—to the extent that the tribunal is 
required to conduct mediation when the parties so request—it does not 
forbid the tribunal from conducting mediation even when a party decides 
against mediation.  
The issue of party consent is dealt with by arbitration rules. For 
instance, CIETAC’s commercial arbitration rules (2015) and investment 
arbitration rules (2017) expressly state that arb-med can only proceed with 
the consent of both parties, and that mediation must end when either party 
withdraws consent.107 BAC, SCIA and SHIAC have rules that stipulate the 
105 China’s Arbitration Law’s first amendment in 2009 changed two article numbers referencing the 
Civil Procedure Law (2007). Its second amendment in 2017 concerned a minor change to the qualification 
of arbitrators. 
106 Zhong hua ren min gong he guo zhong cai fa (中华人民共和国仲裁法) [Arbitration Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 
51(1), 8 CHINA L. & PRAC. 23 (1994) (China). 
107 2015 CIETAC Rules, supra note 63, art. 47; China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (CIETAC) International Investment Arbitration Rules (For Trial Implementation) 
(promulgated by China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (China Chamber of International 
Commerce), Sept. 12, 2017, effective Oct. 1, 2017), art. 43 [hereinafter 2017 CIETAC International 
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same.108 In practice, Fan’s survey shows that 77.8% of arbitrator respondents 
take the initiative to propose arb-med without being prompted by the 
parties;109 this suggests that arb-med is just a “matter of good practice” in 
Chinese arbitration settings.110 However, the survey also found these 
initiatives mainly take place during or after the main hearing in 
arbitration.111 Thus, parties are likely to have the opportunity to argue their 
case without entering the mediation stage. 
A. Market-Based Regulation
As an institutional arbitration dominant jurisdiction,112 China has de
facto delegated the responsibility of arbitration regulation to the market 
through its 253 arbitration institutions. A danger in this regulatory approach 
is the inconsistency of standards practiced by arbitrators and a lack of 
safeguards available to the parties among different Chinese arbitration 
institutions. Foreign investors are unlikely to arbitrate in local arbitration 
institutions that do not have much experience with international disputes. It 
is the institutions focusing on international disputes that are paving the way 
in modernizing and standardizing Chinese arb-med regulation. 
1. Chinese Leading Arbitration Institutions’ Approach to Arb-Med
China’s leading institutions are not high in number and are
concentrated in first-tier cities. Of the 253 institutions, only 60 handled 
“foreign-related” arbitration cases in 2017.113 This number remained stable 
from 2016, when 62 institutions handled “foreign-related” cases.114 
According to CIETAC, only CIETAC, Guangzhou Arbitration Commission 
(“GAC”) and SHIAC handled more than 100 “foreign-related” cases in 
Investment Arbitration Rules], available at 
http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Page&a=index&id=390&l=en. 
108 2015 BAC Rules, supra note 63, art. 67; 2019 SCIA Rules, supra note 63, art. 48; 2015 SHIAC 
Rules, supra note 63, art. 41. 
109 Fan, An Empirical Study of Arbitrators Acting as Mediators in China, supra note 33, at 791. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 795–96. 
112 See, WEIXIA GU, ARBITRATION IN CHINA, supra note 39, at 19–24 (China does not allow ad-hoc 
arbitration). 
113 CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2017), supra note 13, at 14. 
114 CHINA INT’L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION IN CHINA (2016), supra note 22, at 14. 
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2016.115 These numbers, however, are missing from the 2017 report. The 
vast majority of Chinese arbitration institutions do not concern themselves 
with cases involving a foreign party, foreign subject matter, or the 
performance of obligations outside China.116 Therefore, market regulation of 
arb-med, and of arbitration more generally, is shaped by only a handful of 
leading Chinese arbitration institutions.
Indeed, market regulation in this sense is not a purposive exercise to 
control how parties and practitioners utilize arb-med in their conflicts. 
Rather, the leading institutions are constantly reviewing and revising their 
arbitration rules to remain competitive in the market,117 whereby they 
indirectly promote the standard of procedural fairness in cross-border arb-
med. Inter-institutional competition remains a potent force of regulating arb-
med. 
Of the leading Chinese arbitration institutions, the SCIA is the most 
innovative in dealing with arb-med. After SCIA split from CIETAC in 
2012,118 its rules in 2016 allowed parties to international commercial 
disputes, investment disputes, and disputes relating to Hong Kong, Macau 
and Taiwan, to submit their disputes to SCIA using the Arbitration Rules of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) in lieu of SCIA Rules.119 Although this change was in line 
with CIETAC’s 2015 Rules, which allowed hybrid arbitration clauses 
specifying CIETAC arbitration using non-CIETAC arbitration rules (e.g., the 
UNCITRAL Rules),120 it was the first time institutional arbitration rules in 
China explicitly referred to the application of the UNCITRAL rules. The 
2016 SCIA Rules introduced the “Guidelines for the Administration of 
115 Id. 
116 These are the three main circumstances where the court would deem a case to be “foreign-related.” 
The SPC introduced a fourth limb to “foreign-relatedness,” where both companies were wholly-foreign-
owned enterprises registered in a free trade zone in Shanghai, China in 2015, in xi men zi guo ji mao yi ( 
shang hai ) you xian gong si yu shang hai huang jin zhi di you xian gong si shen qing cheng ren he zhi xing 
wai guo zhong cai cai jue an (西门子国际贸易(上海)有限公司与上海黄金置 
地有限公司申请承认和执行外国仲裁裁决案) [Siemens Int’l Trading (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. v. Shanghai 
Golden Landmark Company Limited], CLI.C.9657573(EN) (Shanghai Interm. People’s Ct. Nov. 27, 2015) 
(Lawinfochina) (case concerning application for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award). 
117 Weixia Gu, Piercing the Veil of Arbitration Reform in China: Promises, Pitfalls, Patterns, 
Prognoses, and Prospects, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 799, 826–29 (2017). 
118 Id. at 821–23. 
119 Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA) Arbitration Rules (effective Dec. 1, 2016), art. 
3(4) [hereinafter 2016 SCIA Rules], available at http://www.sccietac.org/web/doc/view_rules/939.html.  
120 2015 CIETAC Rules, supra note 63, art. 4(3). 
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Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules” (“SCIA UNCITRAL 
Guidelines”),121 which further regulate how SCIA is to apply the 
UNCITRAL Rules. This means that foreign parties might opt for the 
UNCITRAL Rules, with which they might be more familiar than the SCIA 
Rules. This approach was confirmed in SCIA’s latest revision to its rules in 
February 2019.122 
With the UNCITRAL Rules, an arbitrator can be challenged “if 
circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s 
impartiality or independence.”123 If, within 15 days from the date of the 
notice of challenge, the challenged arbitrator refuses to withdraw or the 
challenge is not agreed upon by all parties, then the challenging party may 
elect to pursue the challenge.124 In such a case, the SCIA UNCITRAL 
Guidelines specify that the SCIA President will decide on the challenge.125 
But other than this provision, whether an arbitrator may also assume the role 
of mediator is not mentioned. By virtue of Article 51(1) of the China 
Arbitration Law, Chinese arbitration institutions are required to perform arb-
med when both parties are willing and have consented to it. So, it is unclear 
whether using the UNCITRAL Rules would be consistent with the Chinese 
statutory requirement. Although the UNCITRIAL Arbitration Rules are 
silent as to arb-med, it might be useful to consider the position of the 
UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules on arb-med, which require the parties to 
mediation to: 
undertake not to initiate, during the conciliation proceedings, 
any arbitral or judicial proceedings in respect of a dispute that is 
the subject of the conciliation proceedings, except that a party 
may initiate arbitral or judicial proceedings where, in his 
121 Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration (SCIA) Guidelines for the Administration of 
Arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (effective Dec. 1, 2016) [hereafter SCIA UNCITRAL 
Guidelines], available at http://www.sccietac.org/web/doc/view_rules/941.html. 
122 2019 SCIA Rules, supra note 63, art. 3(4). 
123 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (as revised in 2013), art. 12(1) 
[hereinafter 2013 UNCITRAL Rules], https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-
documents/uncitral/en/uncitral-arbitration-rules-2013-e.pdf. 
124 Id. art. 13(4). 
125 SCIA UNCITRAL Guidelines, supra note 121, art. 7(3). 
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opinion, such proceedings are necessary for preserving his 
rights.126 
Instead of including more detailed safeguards in its arbitration rules, 
SCIA and CIETAC seem to be moving away from the Chinese-styled arb-
med, despite that the fact that hybrid resolution is already deeply embedded 
in Chinese arbitration culture. 
Both SCIA and CIETAC have recently created mediation centers or 
set up schemes to allow for mediation by mediators other than the arbitral 
tribunal. SCIA has promoted what it calls “Diversified Harmonious Dispute 
Resolution” (“DHDR”).127 The term echoes an SPC opinion issued in 2016 
pushing for modernization and promoting alternative dispute resolution 
systems as part of China’s Fourth Five-Year Court Reform Plan.128 In 2008, 
SCIA created its mediation center to encourage mediation before and outside 
of existing arbitration proceedings.129 SCIA has also since advertised a 
combination of Hong Kong mediation and Shenzhen arbitration, as well as 
established joint mediation arrangements under the Guangdong–Hong 
Kong–Macau Great Bay Area Commercial Mediation Alliance in December 
2013.130 Likewise, most recently, CIETAC established its own mediation 
center in May 2018.131 
126 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade, UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules (adopted July 23, 1980), art. 16 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules], http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/conc-
rules/conc-rules-e.pdf. 
127 Xiaochun Liu, Innovations of Chinese International Arbitration (2017) (presented at 6th Asia 
Pacific ADR Conference). 
128 Zui Gao Ren Min Fa Yuan Guan Yu Ren Min Fa Yuan Jin Yi Bu Shen Hua Duo Yuan Hua Jiu 
Fen Jie Jue Ji Zhi Gai Ge De Yi Jian (Fa Fa [2016] 14 Hao) 
(最高人民法院关于人民法院进一步深化多元化纠纷解决机制改革的意见) (法发 [2016] 14号) 
[Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on People’s Courts Further Deepening the Reform of Diversified 
Dispute Resolution Mechanism] (Court Issuance No. 14 of 2016) (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., June 28, 
2016, effective June 28, 2016), CLI.3.273230 (EN) (Lawinfochina). 
129 SCIA set up the SCIA Mediation Center in December 2008, see SHENZHEN CT. OF INT’L ARB., 
http://www.sccietac.org/web/doc/mediate.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2019). 
130 See the official website at yue gang ao zhong cai tiao jie lian meng (粤港澳仲裁调解联盟) 
GUANGDONG, HONG KONG & MACAU MEDIATION ALLIANCE, http://www.ghmma.com/nav/2.html (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2019). 
131 CIETAC set up its Mediation Centre and Signed Cooperation Agreement with NEEQ on May 18, 
2018. See CIETAC Set up its Mediation Centre and Signed Cooperation Agreement with NEEQ, CIETAC, 
http://www.cietac.org/index.php?m=Article&a=show&id=15407&l=en (last visited Nov. 2, 2019). 
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2. Investment Arbitration and Arb-Med
While commercial arbitration is a comparatively developed area of
Chinese arbitration, arbitration of investor-state disputes is a more recent 
phenomenon in China. Again, SCIA and CIETAC are leading the 
development. SCIA revised its rules in 2016 to include investor-state 
disputes as one of its arbitrable matters, becoming the first Chinese 
arbitration institution to do so.132 The 2016 SCIA Rules mandate that all 
investment arbitrations submitted to SCIA will be governed by the ready-
made international benchmark in the field (i.e., the UNCITRAL Rules 
applied to ad-hoc investment treaty arbitration), and subject to the SCIA 
UNCITRAL Guidelines.133 But as with above, the UNCITRAL Rules are 
silent on the availability of arb-med. 
CIETAC, on the other hand, specially devised a set of rules for 
investor-state disputes in 2017 independent of its commercial arbitration 
rules.134 The regulations on arb-med, however, do not differ significantly 
compared to the CIETAC general commercial arbitration rules. The 
investment arbitration rules provide that, for adoption of mediation in the 
arbitration process, the tribunal must obtain both parties’ consent before 
proceeding to mediation,135 and the parties may withdraw consent, causing 
the mediation proceedings to end and arbitration to resume.136 
To date, SCIA, CIETAC and BAC137 are the only three arbitration 
institutions in China that accept investor-state disputes. Indeed, there is 
traditionally little interest in arbitrating with China as a host state for 
investment or arbitrating with other host states by Chinese investors under 
the ICSID Convention, which went into force in China in 1993.138 As of 
March 2019, only five cases have been filed by Chinese investors against 
other host states and only three cases have been filed by foreign investors 
132 2016 SCIA Rules, supra note 119, art. 2(2). 
133 Id. art. 3(5). 
134 See 2017 CIETAC International Investment Arbitration Rules, supra note 107. 
135 Id. art. 43(1). 
136 Id. art. 43(6). 
137  BAC Rules of International Investment Arbitration (effective on Oct. 1, 2019), available at 
http://www.bjac.org.cn/page/data_dl/2019%E6%8A%95%E8%B5%84%E4%BB%B2%E8%A3%81%E8
%A7%84%E5%88%990905%20%E8%8B%B1%E6%96%87.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2019). 
138 Tong Qi, How Exactly Does China Consent to Investor-State Arbitration: On the First ICSID 
Case against China, 5 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 265, 268 (2012). 
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against China as a host state.139 Of the five cases filed by the Chinese 
investors, three were actually filed by claimants from outside mainland 
China. The first case brought involved a Hong Kong resident with Chinese 
nationality,140 the second case involved Standard Chartered Bank Hong 
Kong,141 and the most recent one involved Sanum Investments, a Macanese 
company.142 
As for the two concluded cases filed against China thus far, no 
investors have been successful. The parties either discontinued the 
proceeding143 or the award was rendered in favor of the state party.144An 
explanation for the lack of investor-state arbitration against China is the lack 
of trust between the two parties. A consultation by the European 
Commission in 2011 reveals that only 40% of the European investors 
surveyed would opt for investor-state arbitration against China.145 Most 
would rather settle amicably and would consider arbitration for complete 
139 See the official website of the ICSID database at Advanced Case Search, INT’L CTR. FOR 
SETTLEMENT INV. DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/AdvancedSearch.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2019). 
140 Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Award, ¶ 1 (July 7, 2011), 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/255/tza-yap-shum-v-peru (claims 
arising out of the seizure of the bank account of claimant's enterprise due to tax debt and other alleged 
actions undertaken by Peruvian tax authorities resulted in the substantive deprivation of claimant's 
investment). 
141 Standard Chartered Bank (H.K.) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/15/41, Award, ¶ 2 (July 17, 2017), https://arbitration.org/award/744 (Standard Chartered initiated 
proceedings against Tanzania for breaching an agreement under which Tanzania undertook against 
discriminatory action and expropriation to a Tanzanian company that was to develop a power plant. 
Standard Chartered acquired the loan for the power plant project). 
142 See Sanum Investments Limited v. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ADHOC/17/1, (pending). 
143 See Ekran Berhad v. People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/15, Order of 
Discontinuance (May 16, 2013), https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-
settlement/cases/427/ekran-v-china (Ekran’s subsidiary, incorporated in China, had a 70-year land lease 
agreement with the Chinese provincial government in Hainan. The Hainan government revoked the 
subsidiary’s leasehold eleven years after it was granted, citing a regulation on land curbing that allows the 
government to retake without compensation land left undeveloped for more than two years). 
144  See Ansung Housing Co., Ltd. v. People’s Republic of China, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/25, 
Award, ¶ 50 (Mar. 9, 2017), http://icsidfiles.worldbank.org/icsid/ 
ICSIDBLOBS/OnlineAwards/C3885/DC10053_En.pdf, 50 (Mar. 9, 2017) (Ansung entered into an 
agreement with a Communist Party committee of an industrial zone in China to build a golf course, luxury 
condominiums, and a clubhouse. The committee requested Ansung pay a higher price for land use and 
receive a smaller area of land than initially agreed). 
145 European Commission Directorate General for Trade, Summary of contributions to the European 
Commission’s public consultation on “the future investment relationship between the EU and China”, 10 
(2011).  
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expropriation only.146 The reluctance stems from the fear of retaliation, harm 
to existing investments, and loss of potential investment opportunities.147 
80% of the respondents also noted that they did not have confidence in 
Chinese law to protect investor rights due to “lack of transparency and 
consistency of the system which is subject to political pressure.”148  
China has a history of using various means to limit the applicability of 
investor protections. Consider, for example, China’s treatment of investors in 
negotiating its bilateral investment treaties (“BIT”). The national treatment 
clauses in the BITs include qualifying clauses that limit their applicability.149 
These usually take the form of qualifying clauses that allow for derogation 
based on laws and regulations of a contracting party. The Japan-China BIT 
signed in 1988 prevents discriminatory treatment from being deemed as less 
favorable if “in accordance with [a Contracting Party’s] laws and 
regulations, to nationals and companies of the other Contracting Party, . . . it 
is really necessary for the reason of public order, national security or sound 
development of national economy.”150 The necessary reasons to invoke this 
grandfather clause are found in the BIT and its additional protocol.151 A 
more recent BIT concluded between China and Tanzania in 2013 does not 
rely on such broad grounds for derogation. National treatment clauses can 
only be accorded without prejudicing the applicable laws and regulations of 
the host state.152 Similar clause construction is found in the 2011 China-
Uzbekistan BIT153 and the 2009 China-Malta BIT.154 Although China 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. at 4. 
149  Wei Shen, Evolution of Non-Discriminatory Standards in China’s BITs in the Context of EU-
China BIT Negotiations, 17 CHINESE J. INT’L. L. 799, 801-802 (2018). 
150  Agreement between Japan and the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Japan-China, Aug. 27, 1988, 1555 U.N.T.S. 197 [hereinafter Japan-
China BIT]. 
151  Shen, supra note 149, at 807. 
152 Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of 
The United Republic of Tanzania Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
China-Tanz., Mar. 24, 2013 [hereinafter China-Tanzania BIT], 
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/5488/download. 
153 Agreement between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, China-Uzb., Apr. 19, 2011 
[hereinafter China-Uzbekistan BIT], https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaty-files/3357/download. 
154 Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of 
Malta on the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 3(2), China-Malta, Feb. 22, 2009 [hereinafter 
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continues to be reluctant to offer full national treatment protection to foreign 
investors, it has made efforts to reduce the force of national treatment 
qualifiers in recent BITs by committing to reduce non-conforming measures. 
In the Protocol to the 2003 China-Germany BIT, for example, China 
declares that it will take appropriate steps to “progressively remove” the 
non-conforming measures155 to address the non-application of national 
treatment to existing non-conforming measures.156 
Shen, a researcher of EU-China BIT negotiations, argues that China is 
offering different degrees of national treatment protections to developed and 
developing countries so as to attract foreign direct investment from 
developed countries without reducing its discretion over national treatment 
protection of foreign direct investment from investors of developing 
countries.157 National treatment protection is provided to developing 
countries if existing non-conforming measures can continue to operate.158 
The China-Germany BIT, for example, offers such arrangements. The 
Canada-China BIT signed in 2013, however, does not extend national 
treatment protections to existing non-conforming measures without a soft 
clause that declares the parties will strive to remove non-conforming 
measures.159 This soft form national treatment protection is not offered to 
developing countries. 
A possible explanation for the lack of investor-state arbitration 
initiated by Chinese investors is that the majority of Chinese investors 
economically and politically capable of investing in infrastructural projects 
abroad are either Central Government-owned enterprises or other forms of 
state-owned enterprises (“SOE”). Indeed, the BRI is led by Chinese SOE 
investments.160 It remains to be seen, however, whether SCIA’s, CIETAC’s 
China-Malta BIT], https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/3368/download. 
155 Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People’s Republic of China 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment Addendum s. 3, Ger.-China, Dec. 
1, 2003, 2362 U.N.T.S. 253 [hereinafter Germany-China BIT]. 
156 Id. art. 3(1). 
157 Shen, supra note 149, at 810. 
158 Id. 
159 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of 
China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 8, Can.-China, Sept. 9 2012 
[hereinafter Canada–China BIT], https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaty-files/3476/download. 
160 Lauge N. Skovgaard Poulsen, States as Foreign Investors: Diplomatic Disputes and Legal 
Fictions, 31 ICSID REV. 12, 17 (2016). 
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and BAC’s investment arbitration rules will become popular among Chinese 
investors, and whether foreign host states will be more receptive to Chinese 
investment arbitration rules than the delocalized ICSID arbitration or ad-hoc 
investment arbitration administered under the UNCITRAL Rules. For these 
reasons, the effectiveness of arb-med has not been tested in the area of 
investor-state arbitration in China. 
In contrast, while weak due process safeguards in arb-med are a 
pervasive problem, the popularity of Chinese arbitration institutions among 
Chinese arbitration parties is not suffering. International users embrace more 
outward-facing institutions, and many non-mainland Chinese practitioners 
and scholars are involved in the administration of these institutions. The 
reasons are two-fold. 
First, due process protection is mostly dependent on standards and not 
safeguards. Larger institutions such as CIETAC, SCIA and BAC are 
motivated to conduct impartial arbitration not by laws and regulations but by 
market pressures, both internal and external. As long as market pressures 
continue to propel leading institutions to align the Chinese sense of 
mediation with international standards, due process should not pose an issue 
for Chinese arbitration. It remains to be seen whether foreign enterprises and 
investors would prefer a seat of arbitration with greater due process 
safeguards in the region (such as Hong Kong and Singapore) given the 
increased competition in dispute resolution brought about by China’s BRI 
development.  
Second, whether Chinese institutions can attract foreign parties 
depends on whether China can shape dispute resolution norms within the 
BRI. Unlike China’s attempts to amend its laws so that local standards meet 
international standards, norm shaping under the BRI entails the shaping of 
international arbitration expectations to meet Chinese expectations—so that 
potential parties are more receptive to the concept of Chinese arb-med. 
Indeed, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. When making 
assessments on what China should do to promote arb-med under the BRI 
context, however, regard should be had for China’s economic and cultural 
role in the region, as well as its motivations for supporting the BRI. 
In conclusion, for investment arbitration, Chinese and foreign 
investors are still reluctant to use formal investor-state arbitration in China to 
assert their interests. As such, to the author’s knowledge, there is no 
published doctrinal or empirical study of arb-med in the investor-state 
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arbitration field. Informal channels of dispute resolution through diplomacy 
and negotiation may continue to yield better results in China-related 
investment disputes. 
B. Recent Judicial Policy
The Chinese government has always encouraged arb-med, whether in
domestic or cross-border arbitration. Requiring arbitration institutions to 
provide a mediation procedure in the Chinese Arbitration Law shows 
legislative support for this position. But what about the present judicial 
attitude toward the hybrid procedure? 
For domestic arbitration, since 2018, the SPC has made it more 
difficult for lower courts to set aside arbitral awards. The “pre-reporting 
system,” which used to be exclusively applied to “foreign-related cases,”161 
is now applied to arbitration conducted within China without foreign 
elements.162 According to the new provisions, when first instance courts 
have provisionally decided to declare a domestic arbitration agreement 
invalid, by refusing to enforce or by vacating a domestic award, it must first 
report such a decision to its superior provincial-level High People’s Court 
(“HPC”). Only when the HPC agrees with the lower court’s finding can the 
lower court render its decision. Special rules apply when decisions 
invalidating arbitral awards are made on public policy grounds. In these 
circumstances, the HPC must in turn report the case to the SPC. Only when 
both the SPC and the HPC agree with the lower court’s findings can the 
lower court render its decision to set aside the domestic arbitral award.163 
This new judicial policy prevents lower courts from being overzealous 
or becoming subject to local protectionism and corruption against domestic 
awards obtained from outside the Chinese region. It also allows the SPC and 
HPC to harmonize standards for setting aside awards nationally, as well as to 
remove the unequal judicial treatment between domestic awards and awards 
with a foreign element. For arb-med, due to procedural irregularities of the 
161 WEIXIA GU, ARBITRATION IN CHINA, supra note 39, at 14, 31. 
162 Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu zhong cai si fa shen cha an jian bao he wen ti de you guan gui 
ding (fa shi [2017] 21 hao) (最高人民法院关于仲裁司法审查案件报核问题的有关规定) (法释 [2017] 
21号) [Relevant Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning Applications for 
Verification of Arbitration Cases under Judicial Review] (Interpretation No. 21 of 2017) art. 2(2) (issued by 
the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 26, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018), CLI.3.307538 (EN) (Lawinfochina). 
163 Id. art. 3(2). 
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Chinese-style arb-med procedures, the pre-reporting system will cause 
Chinese courts to more reluctantly set aside actually defective awards. 
VI. GLOBAL EXPERIENCES IN REGULATING ARB-MED
A. East-West Perception Divide on Arb-Med
This section examines the East-West divide in how the state,
practitioners, and parties approach arb-med. Such differences are shaped by 
the design of dispute resolution institutions, which are in turn the result of 
how arb-med is perceived by these actors. 
Caution is always needed when attempting to divide legal practices 
into classifications such as the East-West dichotomy. The issue is simply the 
one discussed above: excessively relying on stereotypes and tropes risks not 
accounting for nuanced differences within each group and commonalities 
across groups. The East is usually characterized by the communitarian 
approach to dispute resolution or by the avoidance of social conflict.164 
Accordingly, parties from the East prefer non-contentious dispute resolution 
systems like mediation over litigation and arbitration. By contrast, Western 
parties prefer legal certainty and believe that mediation does not necessarily 
result in a fair and just outcome. They therefore prefer litigation and 
arbitration over mediation. 
These characterizations might hold some truth in domestic arbitration, 
but they are increasingly irrelevant and untenable in the context of cross-
border arbitration. In China, the drive to standardize arbitration norms 
between “foreign-related arbitration” and “domestic arbitration” has made 
the East-West divide less relevant, even for domestic arbitration. Such 
attempts to standardize norms by the SPC include the abolition (in effect) of 
the bifurcation between local arbitration commissions and foreign-related 
arbitration commissions on arbitral jurisdiction and the most recent 
extension of the “pre-reporting” system to domestic arbitrations.165 With 
respect to the “pre-reporting” system, as discussed above, it was applied 
exclusively to foreign-related arbitrations conducted in China or entirely 
foreign arbitrations conducted outside China to mitigate Chinese local 
164 Tai-Heng Cheng, Reflections on Culture in Med-Arb, supra note 9, at 424–25. 
165  Relevant Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues Concerning Applications for 
Verification of Arbitration Cases under Judicial Review, supra note 162, art. 2 (prescribing the pre-
reporting system also be applied to judicial review over purely domestic arbitrations). 
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protectionism concerns but have now been extended to pure domestic 
arbitrations.166 Chinese parties who might engage in cross-border arbitration 
do not necessarily use Chinese lawyers or Chinese arbitrators. Hence, how 
multinational companies choose their desired dispute resolution system may 
be attributed to multiple legal traditions. 
Further, legal practitioners and judges in the West are not as hostile to 
arb-med as the stereotype suggests. In 2006, questionnaires were sent to a 
sample of California judges who served in both trial-judge and settlement-
judge capacities. The judges responded that, before trial, they would seek the 
consent of the parties to set up a settlement conference in an attempt to 
mediate the dispute without litigation. The effect of this procedure is akin to 
arb-med, since if settlement fails, litigation would commence. 80% of the 
respondent judges did not find pre-litigation settlement conferences 
problematic, so long as the parties have consented to the hybrid 
procedure.167 But attempts at setting up regular settlement conferences are 
not common.168 On the specific issue of the judge expressing the merits of 
the parties’ respective cases during the settlement stage in a failed 
settlement, the respondent judges were divided on whether that should be a 
cause for concern.169 In these respects, the Western view is not consistent nor 
unequivocal. 
B. Addressing Arb-Med Procedural Defects in the East and the West
1. Asia
a. Common Law Asia
Certain Asian jurisdictions rely on arbitration legislation to protect
against procedural irregularities. Arbitration laws in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, the most preferred arbitral seats in Asia,170 require arb-med to 
have proper procedural safeguards through provisions exclusively 
addressing procedural irregularity. This is not so in China, where rules of 
166  Id. See also WEIXIA GU, ARBITRATION IN CHINA, supra note 39, at 163-164 and 169. 
167 Stipanowich et al., supra note 30, at 402. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 SCH. OF INT’L ARB. AT QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON & WHITE & CASE LLP, 2018 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 9 (2018), 
http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2018-International-Arbitration-Survey-report.pdf. 
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individual arbitration institutions are the main instruments regulating arb-
med procedures. 
Arbitration legislation in Hong Kong and Singapore pays attention to 
the conflict inherently faced by an arbitrator who later becomes the 
mediator. Both Hong Kong’s Arbitration Ordinance171 and Singapore’s 
International Arbitration Act (“IAA”)172 allow an arbitrator to act as a 
mediator if all parties consent in writing and no party has withdrawn its 
consent in writing.173 Caucusing is also addressed by the statutes, which 
reflects the concern in common law traditions over the confidentiality of 
information provided to the neutral. Then-deputy president of the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators Jeffery Elkinson, commenting on the Keeneye case, 
argues that allowing the arbitrator to meet parties separately to try to reach a 
settlement violates due process.174 When the mediation stage of arb-med 
fails, the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance forces the neutral to disclose, 
before arbitration resumes, any confidential information that is material to 
the case given to her by a party during mediation.175 Singapore’s IAA 
requires the same, in nearly identical language.176 
b. Civil Law Asia
Legislation on arb-med procedure is also found in civil law
jurisdictions in Asia. Like China, Japan is well known to be litigation-
adverse and Japanese prefer more amicable means of resolving disputes. 
Japanese international commercial arbitration has not led to a vibrant market 
of arbitration institutions as seen in China,177 but where arbitration is used, 
arb-med plays a significant role. The Japan Commercial Arbitration 
Association (“JCAA”) studied its arbitration cases from 1999 to 2008 and 
found that in 40% of the cases the tribunal had attempted arb-med,178 out of 
171 Arbitration Ordinance, (2019) Cap. 609 § 33(1) (H.K.). 
172 Sing. Int’l Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) s 17(1). 
173 Arbitration Ordinance, (2019) Cap. 609, 4-22–4-24, § 33(1) (H.K.); Sing. Int’l Arbitration Act 
(Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) s 17(1). 
174 Mark Goodrich, Arb-Med: Ideal Solution or Dangerous Heresy, 15 INT’L. ARB. L. REV. 12, 14 
(2012). 
175 Arbitration Ordinance, (2019) Cap. 609, 4-22–4-24, § 33(4) (H.K.) 
176 Sing. Int’l Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) s 17(3). 
177 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU & WILLIAM E. BUTLER, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND 
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 592 (2d ed. 2013). 
178 Tatsuya Nakamura, Brief Empirical Study on Arb-Med in the JCAA Arbitration, JCAA NEWSL. 
(Japan Commercial Arbitration Ass’n, Tokyo, Japan), Jun. 2009, at 10, 
http://www.jcaa.or.jp/e/arbitration/docs/news22.pdf. 
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which 52% of those cases were concluded by settlement, i.e., the successful 
rate of arb-med attempts or those leading to consent awards could be as high 
as 20.8%. Moreover, no party challenged the neutral on grounds of partiality 
after arbitration had resumed in cases where mediation attempts failed.179 
Japan’s Arbitration Law requires arbitrators to obtain consent from the 
parties for mediation to take place.180 On top of that, the parties must consent 
separately in writing in order for the arbitrator to attempt to mediate the 
dispute.181 This regulatory approach might be described as a “double-
consent” mechanism for arb-med to take place by the same person in Japan. 
Such consent can be withdrawn at any stage of the arbitration. Unlike 
statutes in Hong Kong and Singapore, Japan’s Arbitration Law does not have 
much to say on the conduct of the arb-med neutral. Instead, institutional 
rules have taken the initiative to set out the due process standards for arb-
med. Japan’s Arbitration Law does not, for example, govern the 
confidentiality of information given to the neutral during mediation. 
Provisions governing this are found in the JCAA arbitration rules, which 
forbid the neutral from caucusing without written consent from the parties 
and impose a duty on the neutral to disclose at each instance that an ex parte 
communication has occurred.182 
As mentioned above, the Chinese Arbitration Law has remained 
largely stagnant since its enactment in 1994.183 Due process safeguards, such 
as a requirement of separate consent allowing the same neutral to arbitrate 
and mediate a dispute, are absent from China’s statute. Several leading 
Chinese arbitration institutions are picking up these safeguard procedures, 
albeit any indication whether such procedures will be adopted into law or 
followed by other Chinese arbitration institutions remains absent. 
179 Id. at 10. 
180 Chūsaihō [Arbitration Law], Law No. 138 of 2003, art. 38(1) (Japan), translated at 
https://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/sihou/arbitrationlaw.pdf. 
181 Id., art. 38(4). 
182 Japan Commercial Arbitration Ass’n (JCAA) Commercial Arbitration Rules 59(2) [hereinafter 
2019 JCAA Rules], http://www.jcaa.or.jp/e/arbitration/docs/Commercial_Arbitoration_Rules.pdf. 
183 The Chinese Arbitration Law was amended in 2017 on just one point: to impose the additional 
requirement of “passing the national unified law exam” on those staff members who have been working in 
Chinese arbitration institutions for eight or more years. 
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c. Singapore’s Unique Experience: The AMA Protocol
As previously discussed, even though the 2015 CIETAC Rules and the
2017 CIETAC Investment Arbitration Rules allow parties to choose persons 
other than the arbitrator to be their mediator for arb-med, this option appears 
under-utilized by participating parties.  
In this respect, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre 
(“SIAC”) instead implements separation of arbitration and mediation by 
regulatory and institutional design. In 2014, the SIAC and Singapore 
International Mediation Centre (“SIMC”) launched an Arb-Med-Arb 
Protocol (the “AMA Protocol”), where parties who enter into an arbitration 
agreement can settle through the combination of arbitration and mediation. 
Under the AMA Protocol, arbitration commences and is stayed normally for 
a maximum of eight weeks while SIMC mediation is undertaken. If 
mediation succeeds, the mediation settlement agreement is considered a 
SIAC consent award and is enforceable under the New York Convention.184 
If mediation fails, the parties resume arbitration at SIAC.185 Under the AMA 
Protocol, arbitration and mediation are conducted independently by two 
institutions, the SIAC and the SIMC, respectively, using arbitrators and 
mediators appointed by the two institutions, also respectively.  
The institutional partitioning provides parties a chance at amicable 
settlement without the risk of being subject to the same neutral assuming the 
conflicting roles of mediator and arbitrator. The drawback of institutional 
partitioning is the additional expenditure of time, money, and resources. 
When arb-med is performed under one roof, the time, costs, and resources 
required to appoint mediators (or rather, turn arbitrators into mediators and 
back) are less demanding. 
Since the AMA Protocol was promulgated in 2014, the SIMC has seen 
fourteen cases applying the scheme.186 Among the fourteen cases, two cases 
are still pending, two cases settled before mediation began, seven settled 
184 Arb-Med-Arb, SING. INT’L MEDIATION CTR., http://simc.com.sg/dispute-resolution/arb-med-arb/ 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2019). 
185 Id. 
186 Statistics quoted by Eunice Chua (Assistant Professor of Law at Singapore Management 
University and formerly first Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the SIMC), who obtained the numbers in a 
meeting with SIMC CEO Aloysius Goh in April 2019 (on file with the author). 
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during mediation, and two progressed to arbitration.187 As of October 2018, 
about one-fifth of SIMC’s caseload utilized the AMA Protocol, and as of 
2017, the settlement rate was 85%.188  
Singapore’s AMA approach is quite unique but appropriate in 
rejecting the integrated approach to arb-med, which, as demonstrated by 
how arb-med is conducted in China, has serious defects and due process 
concerns. But the question remains whether Chinese parties, who account 
for most of the caseloads of Chinese arbitration institutions, are receptive to 
such an institutional arrangement akin to Singapore’s. Another question is 
whether Chinese parties are aware of the due process standards required 
internationally and the due process concerns involved when seeking 
overseas enforcement of consent awards. The Keeneye case may have given 
Chinese arbitrators and parties a false sense of security.189 
2. Continental Europe
Regulation of arb-med at the national level is scant in Continental
Europe, despite the popularity of arb-med in France, Switzerland, and 
Germany.190 Civil procedure legislation tends to address mediation during 
litigation, but not arb-med. The arbitration provisions of the French Code of 
Civil Procedure191 do not mention mediation in combination with arbitration 
but do arrange for mediation during litigation.192 Likewise, the Swiss 
Federal Civil Procedure Code only regulates mediation during litigation, but 
not arb-med.193 
Germany’s Code of Civil Procedure, however, does mention arb-med. 
Under Germany’s code, if parties settle a dispute via a mediation process 
during arbitration, the arbitration proceedings end. If the parties so request, 
187 Id. 
188 Aziah Hussin, Claudia Kuck, & Nadja Alexander, SIAC-SIMC's Arb-Med-Arb Protocol, 11 N.Y. 
DISP. RESOL. LAW. 85 (2018), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3329785. 
189 Weixia Gu, The Delicate Art of Med-Arb and Its Future Institutionalisation in China, UCLA 
Pacific Basin Law Journal (2014), at 109. 
190 Renate Dendorfer, Mediation in Germany: Structure, Status Quo and Special Issues, presented at 
Civil Mediation Council Fifth National Conference (Civil Mediation Council Manchester). 
191 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1442-1507 (Fr.). 
192 See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 131-1–131-15 (Fr.) (regulating the use of mediation in 
litigation). 
193 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [SWISS CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] Dec. 19, 2008, 
SR 272, art. 214 (Switz.). 
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the arbitral tribunal “shall record the settlement in the form of an arbitral 
award.”194 An empirical study by Bühring-Uhle, a German scholar of hybrid 
dispute resolution used in international business,  shows that German 
practitioners support using the same neutral to conduct both stages of 
mediation and arbitration.195 The empirical study found that 86% of 
respondents thought that facilitating a consensual solution is one of the 
functions of the arbitral process.196 Most arb-med cases involving German 
practitioners see members of the arbitral tribunal (often the chairperson) 
playing the dual role of mediator.197 Such practice is consistent with German 
court procedures, where judges may also act as mediators.198 As such, this 
practice stemming from a combination of litigation and mediation has made 
German practitioners comfortable with the neutral being both the arbitrator 
and the mediator.199 
The German experience shows that judicial practices can affect the 
willingness of practitioners to accept arb-med. The German judiciary’s 
mediatory role is part of the court’s duty to settle disputes.200 It is therefore 
not uncommon for an adjudicative neutral to subsequently “switch hats” and 
take on a more conciliatory role. Further in line with common practices in 
German courts, Bühring-Uhle’s survey participants were quite familiar with 
this type of process and had very few objections to the involvement of the 
arbitrator as mediator (and only 25% of German respondents thought this 
was not appropriate). This stands in stark contrast to common-law-
jurisdiction-based respondents who rarely encounter this practice (28 out of 
31 have "practically never" seen it) and by a two-thirds majority regard it as 
inappropriate.201  
194 ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], as amended, § 1053, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/englisch_zpo.html (Ger.). 
195  CHRISTIAN BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
110 (2d ed. 2006).  
196 Id.  
197 Id. at 161. 
198  Id. 
199 Id. 
200 See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 76, at 190 (German courts will hold a pre-hearing settlement 
session when possible with the parties during which they make inquiries and assess the merits of the case. 
Such settlement sessions can be held after the proceedings have commenced and even at the appellate 
stage. The court may also refer the parties to another judge to conciliate or to out-of-court alternative 
dispute resolution). 
201  BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 195, at 122. 
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On the contrary, arbitrators in France rarely become mediators in the 
same dispute, even though the French Code of Civil Procedure does not 
expressly bar such practice.202 Although French courts are empowered to 
conduct mediation,203 judges rarely mediate a case themselves.204 
Applying the case study in Germany to China reveals that the 
prevalence of judicial mediation could also be a factor contributing toward 
the wide acceptance of arb-med in China. Judges regularly perform judicial 
mediation as part of their duties. Arb-med would be considered even less 
problematic compared to Germany due to China’s evaluative style of 
mediation, which narrows the gap between the role the neutral plays in 
arbitration and mediation. 
3. Common Law Jurisdictions in the “West”
Turning to common law jurisdictions, in the United States legislation
has not been keeping up with the rise in popularity of arb-med.205 U.S. case 
law is dismissive of an option to conduct hybrid arbitration and mediation. 
In Advanced Bodycare Solutions v. Thione International, the Court of 
Appeals for the 11th Circuit held that a dispute resolution provision in a 
commercial contract allowing parties the option to either mediate or arbitrate 
was not “an agreement to settle by arbitration a controversy.”206 The clause, 
therefore, was not enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act.207 
In a similar vein, arb-med is not addressed in the English Arbitration 
Act of 1996, which regulates arbitration in England and Wales and Northern 
Ireland.208 But English courts have considered issues of procedural 
irregularity that might arise from having the same neutral assume arbitral 
and mediatory roles in a dispute. In Glencot Development & Design v. Ben 
Barrett & Son,209 the court held that the test to apply when assessing whether 
the neutral had been biased was whether the “circumstances would lead a 
202 Id. 
203 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1460 (Fr.). 
204 Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 76, at 190. 
205 BÜHRING-UHLE ET AL., supra note 196, at 122. 
206 Advanced Bodycare Solutions v. Thione Int’l, 524 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 2008). 
207 Id. at 1240 (The Federal Arbitration Act postulates that arbitration will produce a resolution 
“independent of the parties’ acquiescence[,]” which differs from the voluntary agreement mediation aims to 
achieve). 
208 See Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 2(1) (U.K.). 
209 [2001] All ER (D) 384 (UK). 
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fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that there was a real 
possibility, or a real danger . . . that the tribunal was biased.”210 The decision 
in Glencot was ultimately held to be unenforceable, as the mere act of 
caucusing in the mediation phase had compromised the neutral’s impartiality 
and tainted his decision with apparent bias.  
Among Western common law jurisdictions, Australia has considered 
potential procedural pitfalls in its piecemeal reform of arbitration legislation 
beginning as early as 2010. On the domestic arbitration front, Australian 
states and territories have one by one adopted the Commercial Arbitration 
Act (“CAA”) Model Bill of Australia.211 The CAA Model Bill sets out that 
arbitrators can only be a mediator if the governing arbitration agreement 
allows for this arrangement or if every party has consented to the neutral 
switching hats.212 Moreover, party consent is also required for caucusing. In 
addition, the neutral must treat as confidential any information obtained 
from a party during caucusing, and, unless otherwise allowed by the 
governing arbitration agreement, receive the disclosing party’s consent 
before releasing information to the other party.  
Perhaps most important is that the CAA Model Bill does not allow an 
arbitrator-turned-mediator to act as an arbitrator again after a failed 
mediation without first obtaining both parties’ written consent.213 This 
arrangement is unique to the CAA Model Bill and not found in other 
UNCITRAL Model Law jurisdictions like Hong Kong and Singapore. This 
arb-med provision of the Australian Model Bill was tested in Ku-ring-gai 
Council v. Ichor Constructions Pty Ltd most recently before the New South 
Wales Supreme Court,214 where implied consent from both parties was ruled 
to be insufficient to meet the statute’s requirement that the neutral must seek 
written consent before resuming arbitration after a failed mediation or where 
mediation efforts are futile.215 
210 Id. para. 86. 
211  See, e.g., Commercial Arbitration (National Uniform Law) Act 2011 (NT) (Austl.); Commercial 
Arbitration Act 2010 (NSW) (Austl.); Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 (SA) (Austl.); Commercial 
Arbitration Act 2011 (Vic) (Austl.); Commercial Arbitration Act 2011 (Tas) (Austl.); Commercial 
Arbitration Act 2012 (WA) (Austl.); Commercial Arbitration Act 2013 (Qld) (Austl.); Commercial 
Arbitration Act 2017 (ACT) (Austl.). 
212 Commercial Arbitration Bill 2010 (Cth) pt V div 27(D) sub-div 1 (Austl.).  
213  Commercial Arbitration Bill 2010 (Cth) pt V div 27(D) sub-div 4 (Austl.). . 
214 Ku-ring-gai Council v Ichor Constructions Pty Ltd (2018) NSWLR 610 (Austl.). 
215 Id. 
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Such an arb-med regulation regime is, however, not included in the 
international arbitration regime in Australia. The Australian International 
Arbitration Act (“IAA”)216 governs international commercial arbitration in 
Australia. The 2010 amendments to the IAA, whose main objective was to 
incorporate the 2006 amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law into the 
Australian law, did not include an arb-med regime because there were 
concerns that foreign courts would be reluctant to enforce an Australian 
award concluded by arb-med.217 However, as we have seen in the 
experiences of China and other jurisdictions, arb-med awards are being 
enforced by foreign courts. Furthermore, it is precisely for the reason that a 
comprehensive statutory regime guiding international commercial arb-med 
requires impartiality that awards may be enforced overseas. 
VII. PROMOTING ARB-MED UNDER THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE
A. The Popularity and Credibility of Cross-Border Arb-Med
Before asking how China can promote arb-med under the BRI
context, we need to consider what the most valuable and least desirable 
features of cross-border arb-med are to arbitration users. Then the question 
is: what China could do to mitigate the shortcomings of arb-med and, in the 
meantime, amplify its advantages as perceived by potential parties, not only 
Chinese, but also those foreign parties alongside the BRI roadmap? 
A recent survey conducted by Queen Mary University of London, 
surveying mainly European private practitioners, in-house counsels, and 
arbitrators, participants chose the costs involved as the least valuable 
characteristic of cross-border arbitration.218 Only 3% of 922 respondents 
regarded it as one of the “three most valuable characteristics of international 
arbitration” while 67% regarded it as one of the “three worst characteristics 
of international arbitration.”219 “Confidentiality and privacy” (36%) and 
“neutrality” (25%) stood in the middle, while the “enforceability of awards” 
216 International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) pt I div 2D (Austl.). 
217  Richard Garnett, Australia’s International and Domestic Arbitration Framework, in ARBITRATION 
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE RESOURCES SECTOR: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE 21 (Gabriël A. 
Moens & Philip Evans eds., 2015). 
218 SCH. OF INT’L ARB., supra note 170, at 7. 
219 Id. at 7–8. 
DECEMBER  2019 HYBRID DISPUTE RESOLUTION 161 
(64%) and “avoiding specific legal systems/national courts” (60%) were 
chosen as the most valued characteristics.220 
The survey also asked respondents about the factors they contemplate 
when choosing a seat of arbitration. The “general reputation and recognition 
of the seat” is considered the most important factor, followed by “neutrality 
and impartiality of the local legal system,” “national arbitration law[,]” and 
“track record of enforcing agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards.”221 
Despite being considered one of the worst qualities of cross-border 
arbitration, cost was only regarded by about 5% of the respondents as one of 
top four factors in choosing a seat.222 
Compared to other leading arbitral seats and arbitration institutions in 
the Asian region (i.e., the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre 
(“HKIAC”) in Hong Kong and SIAC in Singapore), leading Chinese 
arbitration institutions such as CIETAC, BAC and SCIA are likely less 
attractive to foreign parties than HKIAC and SIAC. As the results of the 
Queen Mary survey reveal, Chinese arbitration institutions should improve 
the neutrality and impartiality of their arb-med procedures and the 
enforceability of their arb-med-produced consent awards. Although the 
outcome of the Keeneye case may be an isolated one, a similar fact pattern 
has not been tested in courts outside of Hong Kong. BRI jurisdictions may 
not pay as much deference to a Chinese supervisory court opinion as did the 
Hong Kong courts. 
One suggestion is that Chinese courts may consider adopting stricter 
standards over the exercise of their supervisory powers for arb-med awards 
manifesting due process issues. Stricter standards would make arb-med more 
popular and credible to potential arb-med users and practitioners as a dispute 
resolution method. While actively supporting deficient arb-med practices 
and making it more difficult for domestic arb-med awards to be set aside 
through unanimous application of the “pre-reporting system” benefits 
China’s overall arbitration enforcement record, Chinese courts are not 
injecting confidence into foreign parties by alleviating Chinese-styled arb-
med due process concerns. Arbitration users are still not seeing Chinese 
courts as competent reviewers of arbitrator partiality when the arbitrator is 
220 Id. at 7. 
221 Id. at 11. 
222 Id. 
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also the mediator. Perception is important, as the Queen Mary survey shows 
that “general reputation and recognition[,]” “neutrality and impartiality of 
the local legal system[,]” and “national arbitration laws” are the most 
important factors considered when parties select an arbitration seat, 
regionally and internationally.223 Arbitration users prefer a seat where the 
formal arbitration legal structure is perceived to be impartial.224 
B. The CICC and the “One-Stop” Hybrid Dispute Resolution Platform
Most recently, China’s Central Government, the State Council,
released in late June 2018 the “Opinion Concerning the Establishment of the 
Belt and Road International Commercial Dispute Resolution Mechanism and 
Institutions” (the “Mechanism and Institutions Opinion”).225 The Mechanism 
and Institutions Opinion stresses the need to build dispute resolution 
mechanisms and institutions that can account for the inconsistencies of law 
and legal culture across the BRI jurisdictions. The solution suggested is a 
“diversified” dispute resolution system to satisfy the range of disputes that 
the BRI will produce. “Diversification” here is taken to mean the use of 
mediation, arbitration, and litigation to resolve disputes.226 But studies below 
show that the diversified dispute resolution mechanism may not necessarily 
be conducted by the same institution (and same personnel) as in Chinese-
styled arb-med practices. 
1. The Establishment of the CICC
The SPC established the CICC days after the Mechanism and
Institutions Opinion was published. The CICC is governed by the 
223 Id. at 10. 
224 Id. 
225 Zhong gong zhong yang ban gong ting, guo wu yuan ban gong ting yin fa guan yu jian li “yi dai yi 
lu” guo ji shang shi zheng duan jie jue ji zhi he ji gou de yi jian 
(中共中央办公厅、国务院办公厅印发《关于建立“一带一路”国际商事争端解决机制和机构的意见
》) [Opinion Concerning the Establishment of the Belt And Road International Commercial Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism and Institutions] (issued by the General Office of the Communist Party Central 
Committee and the General Office of the State Council, June 2018), CLI.5.316324 (EN) (Lawinfochina). 
226 Wen Xin Qiao (乔文心), Chuang xin ji zhi ji gou gong zheng gao xiao bian li jie jue guo ji 
shangshi jiu fen — ren min fa yuan fu wu bao zhang “yi dai yi lu” jian she gong zuo zong shu 
(创新机制机构 公正高效便利解决国际商事纠纷——人民法院服务保障“一带一路”建设工作综述) 
[Innovative Mechanism Institutions Are Fair, Efficient and Convenient to Resolve International 
Commercial Disputes—A Summary of the Construction of the “Belt and Road” for the Service Guarantee 
of the People's Court], CHINA COURT NETWORK (Mar. 5, 2019), 
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2019/03/id/3746817.shtml (China). 
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“Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the 
Establishment of the International Commercial Court” (the “CICC 
Provisions”). The CICC consists of two courts: the First CICC in Shenzhen, 
Guangdong Province, for handling BRI-related international commercial 
disputes arising out of the sea-based Maritime Silk Road (haishang 
sichouzhilu 海上丝绸之路); and the Second CICC in Xi’an, Shaanxi 
Province, for handling BRI-related international commercial disputes arising 
out of the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (sichouzhilu jingjingdai 
丝绸之路经济带). Shenzhen was chosen for its traditional role as a test bed 
of new legal and economic policies and for its strategic geo-economic 
location on the Maritime Silk Road, as well as for being closer to the 
Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macau Great Bay Area.227 Xi’an was chosen for its 
historical position as the starting point of the ancient Silk Road.228 
Inspired by the SICC’s affiliation with the Singapore’s Court of 
Appeal, the two new courts are permanent bodies within the SPC in 
Beijing.229 Its judges are selected from senior judges familiar with 
international laws and norms and proficient in English and Chinese.230 As of 
May 2019, all fourteen judges appointed to the CICC are mainland Chinese 
and hold postgraduate degrees in law—with eight of the judges having either 
visited or studied at a university outside mainland China.231 
 According to Article 2 of the CICC Provisions, the CICC has 
jurisdiction over: 
(1) international commercial cases with the subject matter
worth more than RMB 300 million, where the parties have
agreed in writing to choose the International Commercial Court
227  Xiao Yu (于晓), Wei shen me zai shen zhen, xi’an she guo ji shang shi fa ting? Zui gao fa hui ying 
(为什么在深圳、西安设国际商事法庭？最高法回应) [Why Establish the China International 
Commercial Court (CICC) in Shenzhen and Xi’an? Response from the Supreme People’s Court], CHINA 
NEWS NETWORK (June 28, 2018), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2018/06-28/8549700.shtml (China). 
228 Id. 
229 Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu she li guo ji shang shi fa ting ruo gan wen ti de gui ding (fa shi 
[2018] 11 hao) (最高人民法院关于设立国际商事法庭若干问题的规定) (法释 [2018] 11号) [Provisions 
of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Establishment of the International 
Commercial Court] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., June 25, 2018, effective July 1, 2018), art. 1, 
available at http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/208/210/817.html (China). 
230  Id. art. 4. 
231  See Judges, CHINA INT’L COMMERCIAL COURT, 
http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/193/196/index.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2019). 
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for adjudication in accordance with Article 34 of the Chinese 
Civil Procedure Law (2017); 
(2) first instance international commercial cases under the
jurisdiction of the Provincial High People’s Courts (HPC) that
the HPC deems it should be adjudicated by the SPC, and the
SPC has so permitted;
(3) first instance international commercial cases of national
significance;
(4) applications for arbitration preservation measures under
Article 14 of the CICC Provisions and applications to revoke or
enforce an award from an international commercial arbitration;
and
(5) any other international commercial cases the SPC deems the
CICC should have jurisdiction over.232
Article 3 then prescribes the scope of “international commercial 
cases” where: 
(1) at least one party has a non-Chinese nationality, has no
nationality, is a foreign enterprise or organization;
(2) at least one party habitually reside outside of the People’s
Republic of China;
(3) the subject matter is outside of the People’s Republic of
China; or
(4) the legal fact of creation, amendment or extinguishment of
the commercial relationship occurred outside the People’s
Republic of China.233
In short, the CICC handles complex international commercial cases 
but does not extend its jurisdiction to investor-state investment disputes. 
This is because of an early SPC interpretation of China’s reservation in its 
accession to the New York Convention in 1986.234 However, according to 
232  Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Establishment of the 
International Commercial Court, supra note 229, art. 2. 
233  Id. art. 3. 
234  Zui gao ren min fa yuan guan yu zhi xing wo guo jia ru de “cheng ren ji zhi xing wai guo zhong 
cai cai jue gong yue” de tong zhi (fa (jing) fa [1987] 5 hao) 
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CICC Justice Gao Xiaoli, China’s reservation may be reconsidered in the 
future.235 
2. The CICC’s “One-Stop” Hybrid Dispute Resolution Platform
For arb-med, the most important CICC provisions are Articles 11 and
14. Article 11 formulates the establishment of a new “one-stop” international
commercial dispute resolution mechanism as follows:
The Supreme People’s Court will set up an International 
Commercial Expert Committee (ICEC) and select qualified 
international commercial mediation institutions and 
international commercial arbitration institutions to build up 
together with the CICC a “one-stop” international commercial 
dispute resolution platform on which mediation, arbitration, and 
litigation are efficiently linked. 
The International Commercial Court supports parties to 
settle their international commercial disputes by choosing the 
approach they consider appropriate through the dispute 
resolution platform on which mediation, arbitration and 
litigation are efficiently linked. 
Article 14 then links the CICC with international commercial 
arbitration institutions: 
Where parties agree to submit their disputes to arbitration by an 
international commercial arbitration institution under Article 11 
paragraph 1 of the CICC Provisions, they may apply to the 
CICC for a ruling on the preservation of property, evidence or 
conduct before or after the arbitration proceeding commences. 
Where a party makes an application to the CICC for 
setting aside or enforcement of an arbitral award rendered by an 
international commercial arbitration institution under Article 11 
paragraph 1 of the CICC Provisions, the CICC shall review the 
(最高人民法院关于执行我国加入的《承认及执行外国仲裁裁决公约》的通知) (法(经)发 [1987] 5号) 
[Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Implementing the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Acceded to by China] (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 10, 
1987, effective Apr. 10, 1987), art. 2, CLI.3.3255 (EN) (Lawinfochina). 
235  He & Yan, Creating the International Commercial Court, supra note 49. 
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application in accordance with provisions of the Chinese Civil 
Procedure Law and other related legal provisions.236 
Pursuant to Article 11, CICC now allows international commercial 
disputes to be mediated and arbitrated through a single, combined set of 
procedures. The single platform does not imply that mediation and 
arbitration is to be conducted by the same personnel or institution, as in 
traditional Chinese-styled arb-med. Rather, by pointing international 
arbitration and mediation conducted under the CICC to different arbitration 
institutions and mediation institutions,237 Article 11 seems to suggest that 
mediation and arbitration in arb-med procedures are to be conducted by 
separate mediation and arbitration institutions. This creation of an integrated 
mediation and arbitration platform using separate institutions is an important 
feature of the CICC, and exhibits China’s innovation of providing a “one-
stop” hybrid dispute resolution platform that aims to alleviate due process 
concerns in cross-border arb-med in the BRI dispute resolution context. 
While detailed implementation rules are still under preparation, as 
recent as December 2018, the CICC designated five Chinese arbitration 
institutions and two mediation institutions to be part of its “one-stop” 
integrated mediation and arbitration platform.238 
The five arbitration institutions designated by the CICC are all leading 
Chinese arbitral institutions: CIETAC, SCIA, BAC, Shanghai International 
Arbitration Center (“SHIAC”),239 and China Maritime Arbitration 
Commission (“CMAC”).240 These institutions are considered the most 
experienced, capable, and credible Chinese arbitration institutions handling 
236 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Regarding the Establishment of the 
International Commercial Court, supra note 229, art. 14.  
237  Id. 
238 The CICC issues its working rules, rules regarding expert committee and designation of Mainland 
arbitration and mediation institutions at an official press release, 
http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/218/149/156/1128.html. 
239 SHIAC is accessible at http://www.shiac.org/SHIAC/arbitrate_items_E.aspx. 
240 CMAC is accessible at http://www.cmac.org.cn/?lang=en; Zui gao ren min fa yuan ban gong ting 
guan yu que ding shou pi na ru “yi zhan shi” guo ji shang shi jiu fen duo yuan hua jie jue ji zhi de guo ji 
shang shi zhong cai ji tiao jie ji gou de tong zhi (fa ban [2018] 212 hao) 
(最高人民法院办公厅关于确定首批纳入“一站式”国际商事纠纷多元化解决机制的国际商事仲裁及
调解机构的通知) (法办 [2018] 212 号) [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Inclusion of the First 
Group of International Commercial Arbitration and Mediation Institutions in the “One-Stop” Diversified 
International Commercial Dispute Resolution Mechanism], ¶ 2 (issued by the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 13, 
2018, effective Dec. 5, 2018), http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/208/210/1144.html. 
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cross-border arbitration cases,241 and are expected to be the forefront venues 
in BRI-related arbitration. Parties to arbitration cases at one of the above 
designated institutions may apply for recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards directly to the CICC, which is expected to significantly enhance the 
quality of judicial review of awards from these five arbitral institutions.242 
As the two CICCs are permanent bodies of the SPC, the scheme can be 
understood as the SPC providing direct support and supervision over BRI-
related arbitration. 
Likewise, the CICC has designated two of the most experienced 
institutional mediation providers in China243 to work with its “one-stop” 
hybrid dispute resolution platform.244 The two mediation institutions are the 
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (“CCPIT”) 
Mediation Center245 and the Shanghai Commercial Mediation Center 
(“SCMC”).246 If all the Chinese legislative requirements on mediation are 
satisfied, mediation settlement agreements reached at the two designated 
Chinese mediation centers can be converted into CICC judicial settlement 
agreements, or even judgments issued by the CICC.247 
3. Implications
The creation of all these new schemes signals a strong attempt by the
CICC to move away from conducting arbitration (or litigation) and 
mediation under one roof and by the same neutral—the practice of which 
foreign parties are skeptical due to procedural irregularities. The CICC’s 
new efforts bear some resemblance to Singapore’s AMA Protocol. This is 
particularly interesting given the BRI development, because alternative 
approaches to cross-border disputes, such as mediation combined with 
arbitration, are expected to rise exponentially where China is expected to 
241  The arbitration institutions listed by CICC exclude those of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 
242 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Inclusion of the First Group of International Commercial 
Arbitration and Mediation Institutions in the “One-Stop” Diversified International Commercial Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism, supra note 240, at ¶ 4. 
243  Again, the mediation institutions listed by CICC exclude those of Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. 
244 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Inclusion of the First Group of International Commercial 
Arbitration and Mediation Institutions in the “One-Stop” Diversified International Commercial Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism, supra note 240, at ¶ 2. 
245 CCPIT Mediation Center is accessible at http://adr.ccpit.org/EN/Index/index.html. 
246 SCMC is accessible at http://www.scmc.org.cn/. 
247 Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Inclusion of the First Group of International Commercial 
Arbitration and Mediation Institutions in the “One-Stop” Diversified International Commercial Dispute 
Resolution Mechanism, supra note 240, at ¶ 3. 
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take the lead in streamlining BRI-related cross-border dispute resolution 
processes. 
Under the BRI context, China faces competition with two of the most 
popular seats of arbitration in both the Asia-Pacific and the world: Hong 
Kong and Singapore.248 As both the initiator of and the largest economy in 
the BRI, China is in the unique position to shape future BRI arbitration 
norms. There are early indications of China’s intention to assume a larger 
role in BRI arbitration. The 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China (“CCCPC”) passed a key decision in 2014 during its Fourth 
Plenum on “comprehensively advancing ruling the country in accordance 
with law,”249 in line with Xi Jinping’s then-new mantra of socialist rule of 
law with Chinese characteristics. The decision includes a section on 
“foreign-related legal work,” which among other things states that China 
should “actively participate in the creation of international rules”250 and 
should “strengthen [its] voice and influence in international legal affairs, so 
as to protect [its] sovereignty, security and developmental interests by legal 
means.”251 
Therefore, besides the need to attract foreign parties to compete with 
regional institutions, China also needs to establish regional arbitration norms 
with respect to the BRI. These needs are the leading factors pushing China 
to look beyond legal-political factors. 
As evidenced by the CICC’s most recent efforts, the shift to separate 
mediation and arbitration into different institutions rather than prescribing 
arb-med under one roof using the same neutral(s) may indicate that, where 
disputes are not exclusively Chinese (i.e., cross-border commercial 
disputes), China is willing to explore due-process-valued hybrid resolution 
processes. While mediation is an essential part of the Chinese cultural 
legacy, arb-med may not necessary be at the expense of justice and 
impartiality. What the CICC’s “One-Stop” Platform sacrifices in comparison 
248 SCH. OF INT’L ARB., supra note 170, at 10. 
249 Zhong gong zhong yang guan yu quan mian tui jin yi fa zhi guo ruo gan zhong da wen ti de jue 
ding (中共中央关于全面推进依法治国若干重大问题的决定) [Decision of the CPC Central Committee 
on Major Issues Pertaining to Comprehensively Promoting the Rule of Law] (promulgated by Cent. Comm. 
of the Communist Party of China, Oct. 23, 2014, effective Oct. 23, 2014), CLI.5.237344 (EN) 
(Lawinfochina). 
250 Id. art. 7(7). 
251 Id. 
DECEMBER  2019 HYBRID DISPUTE RESOLUTION 169 
to traditional Chinese-styled arb-med, though, is the efficiency and lower 
costs afforded by using a dual-role neutral. However, foreign parties seem 
relatively less concerned with the cost of arbitration than Chinese domestic 
parties. As argued, the need to attract foreign parties in addition to merely 
Chinese ones and the pressure to compete in the BRI arbitration market 
might be the primary factors in reducing a Chinese characteristic divide in 
arb-med practices. 
Indeed, the development of arbitration norms in China is 
bidirectional—it involves both localized globalism and globalized 
localism.252 The former direction is well known, for it is frequently 
highlighted in government documents as taking reference of foreign 
experiences during arbitral reforms. The latter, where local norms are 
transformed into international norms, is less known but increasing in regard, 
especially in the context of BRI dispute resolution that is going to be 
increasingly shaped by China. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
While mediation is more culture-laden and jurisdiction-specific,
arbitration is more international due to the successful harmonization efforts 
of the international legal instruments in the field.  Arb-med traverses the 
spheres of local and international norms and practices. With mediation as a 
local product that may potentially go abroad when combined with 
arbitration, arb-med encompasses significant international implications. 
China should regulate arb-med in a way to reconcile local practices 
(mediation) with international expectations (arbitration) under the BRI 
dispute resolution context. In doing so, China should reform its arb-med 
practices; mediation and arbitration procedures should be separated so as to 
comply with international due process standards. 
China’s proposed economic bloc, the BRI development, has the 
potential to promote dispute resolution means with Chinese characteristics 
such as arb-med. Parties to Chinese-style arb-med, based on cultural 
harmony, procedural looseness, and outcome-orientation, might find their 
252 See generally, Kun Fan, “Glocalization” of International Arbitration—Rethinking Tradition: 
Modernity and East-West Binaries through Examples of China and Japan, 11 U. OF PA. ASIAN L. REV. 243, 
(2017). 
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arb-med-produced awards will not be recognized nor enforced due to 
Chinese arb-med’s failure to comply with internationally recognized due 
process standards, like those of New York Convention. As such, in the end, 
the promotion of a Chinese-styled hybrid commercial dispute resolution 
system in which arb-med is essential comes down to the following question: 
how crucial is it to address the due process defects of Chinese-styled arb-
med in the eyes of Chinese legislators and regulators, arbitration institutions, 
and potential parties, both Chinese and foreign?  
Interestingly, the development of arb-med in China over the past 
decade does not seem to indicate that due process issues are so pressing that 
party familiarity and dispute resolution efficiency are to be subverted for 
higher standards of impartiality, especially for Chinese domestic parties. It is 
still too early to make conclusions on whether Chinese-styled arb-med with 
its due process concerns will impede cross-border dispute resolution 
processes under the BRI. However, as discussed, judging from the most 
recent efforts of leading Chinese arbitration institution such as CIETAC, 
BAC, and SCIA, it is evident that regulation of arb-med detaching the two 
processes has become the trend when faced with international clients and the 
need to compete with international arbitration institutions in the BRI dispute 
resolution market.  
Global comparative study of leading arbitration jurisdictions in the 
East and the West shows a heightened awareness of arb-med due process 
concerns. Among the jurisdictions surveyed, this article argues that 
Singapore in Asia, Germany in the European Continent, and Australia in the 
Pacific have already impacted reforms of arb-med systems by some of the 
most influential Chinese arbitration institutions. Singapore’s AMA Protocol, 
in particular, has already influenced the CICC’s recent “One-Stop” Multi-tier 
Dispute Resolution Platform. 
Both the establishment of the CICC and its publication of the “One-
Stop” Platform show an awareness of the procedural justice issues in the 
hybrid dispute resolution trending globally, as well as a proper shift in the 
quality of Chinese judicial mentality; both of which signal the acceptance of 
further arb-med practice in the BRI dispute resolution context that China is 
expected to spearhead. The CICC’s most recent actions show that leading 
international arbitration norms and attracting foreign parties, in addition to 
BRI-dispute-resolution-market pressures, are the main factors driving 
Chinese regulators to look beyond sociopolitical imperatives and cultural 
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boundaries. Moreover, as China is anticipated to spearhead the BRI 
arbitration and dispute resolution system, Chinese arb-med will remain a 
fluid area of localized globalism vis-à-vis globalized localism in China-led 
BRI development. 
Apart from separating mediation and arbitration procedures in arb-
med, Chinese courts should also change what they consider to be a “pro-
arbitration” judicial attitude. For many years, the Chinese courts have taken 
a “pro-arbitration” judicial approach emphasizing the number of arbitral 
awards enforced in China and overseas. The extension of the “pre-reporting” 
system to China’s domestic arbitration regime has become a natural outcome 
and would make numerous defective arb-med awards impossible to be set 
aside. Equally, if not more, important is the quality of China’s arbitration 
processes. The quality of judicial review over the arbitration process, i.e., the 
real role that court systems play in supervising the arbitration process, 
should be emphasized in reforms as an essential component of the “pro-
arbitration” judicial attitude. 
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